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Abstract. We present an illative system Is of classical higher-order
logic with subtyping and basic inductive types. The system Is allows for
direct definitions of partial and general recursive functions, and provides
means for handling functions whose termination has not been proven.
We give examples of how properties of some recursive functions may be
established in our system. In a technical appendix to the paper we prove
consistency of Is. The proof is by model construction. We then use this
construction to show conservativity of Is over classical first-order logic.
Conservativity over higher-order logic is conjectured, but not proven.
Note: This paper is an extended technical report based on a conference pa-
per with the same title published by Springer-Verlag in the proceedings of FoS-
SaCS 2013. The final publication is available at springerlink.com.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
We present an illative λ-calculus system Is of classical higher-order logic with
subtyping and basic inductive types. Being illative means that the system is a
combination of higher-order logic with the untyped λ-calculus. It therefore allows
for unrestricted recursive definitions directly, including definitions of possibly
non-terminating partial functions. We believe that this feature of Is makes it
potentially interesting as a logic for an interactive theorem prover intended to
be used for program verification.
Most popular proof assistants allow only total functions, and totality must
be ensured by the user, either by very precise specifications of function do-
mains, restricting recursion in a way that guarantees termination, explicit well-
foundedness proofs, or other means.
Obviously, there is a reason why most proof assistants do not handle partial
functions directly. This is to ensure consistency of the system. Combining an
expressive higher-order logic with unrestricted recursion is a non-trivial problem.
There are various indirect ways of dealing with general recursion in popular
theorem provers based on total logics. There are also many non-standard logics
allowing partial functions directly. We discuss some related work in Sect. 5.
In Sect. 2 we introduce the system Is. Our approach builds on the old tra-
dition of illative combinatory logic [1,2,3,4]. This tradition dates back to early
inconsistent systems of Sho¨nfinkel, Church and Curry proposed in the 1920s and
the 1930s [2]. However, after the discovery of paradoxes most logicians aban-
doned this approach. A notable exception was Haskell Curry and his school, but
not much progress was made in establishing consistency of illative systems strong
enough to interpret traditional logic. Only in the 1990s some first-order illative
systems were shown consistent and complete for traditional first-order logic [1,5].
The system Is, in terms of the features it provides, may be considered an ex-
tension of the illative system Iω from [3]. We briefly discuss the relationship
between Is and Iω in Sect. 5.
Because Is is based on the untyped λ-calculus, its consistency is obviously
open to doubt. In an appendix we give a proof by model construction of consis-
tency of Is. Unfortunately, the proof is too long to fit within the page limits of a
conference paper. In Sect. 3 we give a general overview of the proof. The model
construction is similar to the one from [3] for the traditional illative system Iω.
It is extended and adapted in a non-trivial way to account for additional fea-
tures of Is. To our knowlege Is is the first higher-order illative system featuring
subtypes and some form of induction, for which there is a consistency proof.
In Sect. 4 we provide examples of proofs in Is indicating possible applications
of our approach to the problem of dealing with partiality, non-termination and
general recursion in higher-order logic. We are mainly interested in partiality
arising from non-termination of non-well-founded recursive definitions.
For lack of space we omit proofs of most of the lemmas and theorems we
state. The proofs of non-trivial results may be found in technical appendices to
this paper.
2
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2 The Illative System
In this section we present the system Is of illative classical higher-order logic
with subtyping and derive some of its basic properties.
Definition 2.1. The system Is consists of the following.
– A countably infinite set of variables Vs = {x, y, z, . . .} and a set of con-
stants Σs.
– The set of sorts S = {Type,Prop}.
– The set of basic inductive types TI is defined inductively by the rule: if
ι1,1, . . . , ι1,n1 , . . . , ιm,1, . . . , ιm,nm ∈ TI ∪ {⋆} then
µ(〈ι1,1, . . . , ι1,n1〉, . . . , 〈ιm,1, . . . , ιm,nm〉) ∈ TI
where m ∈ N+ and n1, . . . , nm ∈ N.
– We define the sets of constructors C, destructors D, and tests O as follows.
For each ι ∈ TI of the form
ι = µ(〈ι1,1, . . . , ι1,n1〉, . . . , 〈ιm,1, . . . , ιm,nm〉) ∈ TI
where ιi,j ∈ TI ∪{⋆}, the set C contains m distinct constants cι1, . . . , c
ι
m. The
number ni is called the arity of c
ι
i, and 〈ιi,1, . . . , ιi,ni〉 is its signature. With
each cιi ∈ C of arity ni we associate ni distinct destructors d
ι
i,1, . . . , d
ι
i,ni
∈ D
and one test oιi ∈ O. When we use the symbols c
ι
i, o
ι
i and d
ι
i,j we implicitly
assume that they denote the constructors, tests and destructors associated
with ι. When it is clear from the context which type ι is meant, we use the
notation ι∗i,j for ιi,j if ιi,j 6= ⋆, or for ι if ιi,j = ⋆.
– The set of Is-terms T is defined by the following grammar.
T ::= Vs | Σs | S | C | D | O | TI | λVs .T | (TT) | Is | Subtype | Fun |
∀ | ∨ | ⊥ | ǫ | Eq | Cond
We assume application associates to the left and omit spurious brackets.
– We identify α-equivalent terms, i.e. terms differing only in the names of
bound variables are considered identical. We use the symbol ≡ for identity
of terms up to α-equivalence. We also assume without loss of generality that
all bound variables in a term are distinct from the free variables, unless
indicated otherwise.1
– In what follows we use the abbreviations:
t1 : t2 ≡ Is t1 t2
{x : α | ϕ} ≡ Subtypeαλx . ϕ
α→ β ≡ Funαβ
∀x : α . ϕ ≡ ∀αλx . ϕ
1 So e.g. in the axiom β the free variables of t2 do not become bound in t1[x/t2].
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∀x1, . . . , xn : α . ϕ ≡ ∀x1 : α . . . . ∀xn : α . ϕ
ϕ ⊃ ψ ≡ ∀x : {y : Prop | ϕ} . ψ where x, y /∈ FV (ϕ, ψ)
¬ϕ ≡ ϕ ⊃ ⊥
⊤ ≡ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥
ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ∨ϕψ
ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
∃x : α . ϕ ≡ ¬∀x : α .¬ϕ
We assume that ¬ has the highest precedence.
– The system Is is given by the following rules and axioms, where Γ is a finite
set of terms, t, ϕ, ψ, α, β, etc. are arbitrary terms. The notation Γ, ϕ is a
shorthand for Γ ∪ {ϕ}. We use Greek letters ϕ, ψ, etc. to highlight that a
term is to be intuitively interpreted as a proposition, and we use α, β, etc.
when it is to be interpreted as a type, but there is no a priori syntactic
distinction. All judgements have the form Γ ⊢ t where Γ is a set of terms
and t a term. In particular, Γ ⊢ t : α is a shorthand for Γ ⊢ Is t α, according
to the convention from the previous point.
Axioms
1: Γ, ϕ ⊢ ϕ
2: Γ ⊢ Eq t t
3: Γ ⊢ Prop : Type
4: Γ ⊢ ι : Type for ι ∈ TI
5: Γ ⊢ oιi(c
ι
it1 . . . tni) if c
ι
i ∈ C has arity ni
6: Γ ⊢ ¬(oιi(c
ι
jt1 . . . tnj )) if i 6= j and c
ι
j ∈ C has arity nj
7: Γ ⊢ Eq (dιi,k(c
ι
it1 . . . tni)) tk for k = 1, . . . , ni, if c
ι
i ∈ C has arity ni
⊥t: Γ ⊢ ⊥ : Prop
c: Γ ⊢ ∀p : Prop . p ∨ ¬p
β: Γ ⊢ Eq ((λx . t1)t2) (t1[x/t2])
Rules
∀i :
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ, x : α ⊢ ϕ x /∈ FV (Γ, α)
Γ ⊢ ∀x : α . ϕ
∀e :
Γ ⊢ ∀x : α . ϕ Γ ⊢ t : α
Γ ⊢ ϕ[x/t]
∀t :
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ, x : α ⊢ ϕ : Prop x /∈ FV (Γ, α)
Γ ⊢ (∀x : α . ϕ) : Prop
∃i :
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ ⊢ t : α Γ ⊢ ϕ[x/t]
Γ ⊢ ∃x : α . ϕ
∃e :
Γ ⊢ ∃x : α . ϕ Γ, x : α, ϕ ⊢ ψ x /∈ FV (Γ, ψ, α)
Γ ⊢ ψ
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∨i1 :
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
∨i2 :
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
∨e :
Γ ⊢ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 Γ, ϕ1 ⊢ ψ Γ, ϕ2 ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
∨t :
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop Γ ⊢ ψ : Prop
Γ ⊢ (ϕ ∨ ψ) : Prop
∧e1 :
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ
∧e2 :
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
⊃t2:
Γ ⊢ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) : Prop
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
⊥e :
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ϕ
→i:
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ, x : α ⊢ t : β x /∈ FV (Γ, α, β)
Γ ⊢ (λx . t) : α→ β
→e:
Γ ⊢ t1 : α→ β Γ ⊢ t2 : α
Γ ⊢ t1t2 : β
→t:
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ ⊢ β : Type
Γ ⊢ (α→ β) : Type
si :
Γ ⊢ {x : α | ϕ} : Type Γ ⊢ t : α Γ ⊢ (λx . ϕ)t x /∈ FV (α)
Γ ⊢ t : {x : α | ϕ}
se :
Γ ⊢ t : {x : α | ϕ}
Γ ⊢ ϕ[x/t]
set :
Γ ⊢ t : {x : α | ϕ}
Γ ⊢ t : α
st :
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ, x : α ⊢ ϕ : Prop x /∈ FV (α)
Γ ⊢ {x : α | ϕ} : Type
ǫi :
Γ ⊢ ∃x : α .⊤
Γ ⊢ (ǫα) : α
pi :
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
c1 :
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ Eq (Condϕ t1 t2 ) t1
c2 :
Γ ⊢ ¬ϕ
Γ ⊢ Eq (Condϕ t1 t2 ) t2
c3 :
Γ, ϕ ⊢ Eq t1 t
′
1 Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
Γ ⊢ Eq (Condϕ t1 t2 ) (Condϕ t
′
1 t2 )
c4 :
Γ,¬ϕ ⊢ Eq t2 t
′
2 Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
Γ ⊢ Eq (Condϕ t1 t2 ) (Condϕ t1 t
′
2 )
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c5 :
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
Γ ⊢ Eq (Condϕ t t ) t
eq :
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ Eqϕϕ′
Γ ⊢ ϕ′
eq-sym :
Γ ⊢ Eq t1 t2
Γ ⊢ Eq t2 t1
eq-trans :
Γ ⊢ Eq t1 t2 Γ ⊢ Eq t2 t3
Γ ⊢ Eq t1 t3
eq-cong-app :
Γ ⊢ Eq t1 t
′
1 Γ ⊢ Eq t2 t
′
2
Γ ⊢ Eq (t1t2) (t
′
1t
′
2)
eq-λ-ξ :
Γ ⊢ Eq t t′ x /∈ FV (Γ )
Γ ⊢ Eq (λx . t) (λx . t′)
iιi :
Γ, x1 : ι
∗
i,1, . . . , xni : ι
∗
i,ni , txji,1 , . . . , txji,ki ⊢ t(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni)
for i = 1, . . . ,m
Γ ⊢ ∀x : ι . tx
where x, x1, . . . , xni /∈ FV (Γ, t), c
ι
1, . . . , c
ι
m ∈ C are all constructors associ-
ated with ι ∈ TI , and ji,1, . . . , ji,ki is an increasing sequence of all indices
1 ≤ j ≤ ni such that ιi,j = ⋆
iι,kt :
Γ ⊢ tj : ι
∗
k,j for j = 1, . . . , nk
Γ ⊢ (cιkt1 . . . tnk) : ι
For an arbitrary set of terms Γ , we write Γ ⊢Is ϕ if there exists a finite subset
Γ ′ ⊆ Γ such that Γ ′ ⊢ ϕ is derivable in the system Is. We drop the subscript
when irrelevant or obvious from the context.
Lemma 2.2. If Γ ⊢ ϕ then Γ, ψ ⊢ ϕ.
Lemma 2.3. If Γ ⊢ ϕ then Γ [x/t] ⊢ ϕ[x/t], where Γ [x/t] = {ψ[x/t] | ψ ∈ Γ}.
2.1 Representing Logic
The inference rules of Is may be intuitively justified by appealing to an infor-
mal many-valued semantics. A term t may be true, false, or something entirely
different (“undefined”, a program, a natural number, a type, . . . ). By way of an
example, we explain an informal meaning of some terms:
– t : Prop is true iff t is true or false,
– α : Type is true iff α is a type,
– t : α is true iff t has type α, assuming α is a type,
6
2. THE ILLATIVE SYSTEM
– ∀x : α.ϕ is true iff α is a type and for all t of type α, ϕ[x/t] is true,
– ∀x : α.ϕ is false iff α is a type and there exists t of type α such that ϕ[x/t]
is false,
– t1 ∨ t2 is true iff t1 is true or t2 is true,
– t1 ∨ t2 is false iff t1 is false and t2 is false,
– t1 ⊃ t2 is true iff t1 is false or both t1 and t2 are true,
– t1 ⊃ t2 is false iff t1 is true and t2 is false,
– ¬t is true iff t is false,
– ¬t is false iff t is true.
Obviously, Γ ⊢ t is then (informally) interpreted as: for all possible substitution
instances Γ ∗, t∗ of Γ, t, 2 if all terms in Γ ∗ are true, then the term t∗ is also true.
Note that the logical connectives are “lazy”, e.g. for t1 ∨ t2 to be true it
suffices that t1 is true, but t2 need not have a truth value at all – it may be
something else: a program, a type, “undefined”, etc. This laziness allows us to
omit many restrictions which would otherwise be needed in inference rules, and
would thus make the system less similar to ordinary logic.
The following rules may be derived in Is.
⊃i:
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ
⊃e:
Γ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ψ
⊃t:
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ : Prop
Γ ⊢ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) : Prop
∧i :
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Note that in general the elimination rules for ∧ and the rules for ∃ cannot
be derived from the rules for ∨ and ∀, because we would not be able to prove
the premise ϕ : Prop when trying to apply the rule ⊃i. It is instructive to try to
derive these rules and see where the proof breaks down.
In Is the only non-standard restriction in the usual inference rules for logical
connectives is the additional premise Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop in the rule ⊃i. It is cer-
tainly unavoidable, as otherwise Curry’s paradox may be derived (see e.g. [1,2]).
However, we have standard classical higher-order logic if we restrict to terms of
type Prop, in the sense that the natural deduction rules then become identical
to the rules of ordinary logic. This is made more precise in Sect. 3 where a sound
translation from a traditional system of higher-order logic into Is is described.
Note that we have the law of excluded middle only in the form ∀p : Prop . p∨
¬p. Adding Γ ⊢ ϕ∨¬ϕ as an axiom for an arbitrary term ϕ gives an inconsistent
system.3
It is well-known (see e.g. [6, Chapter 11]) that in higher-order logic all logical
connectives may be defined from ∀ and ⊃ as follows.
⊥ ≡ ∀p : Prop . p
2 To be more precise, for every possible substitution of terms for the free variables
of Γ, t we perform this substitution on Γ, t, denoting the result by Γ ∗, t∗.
3 By defining (see the next subsection) ϕ = ¬ϕ one could then easily derive ⊥ using
the rule ∨e applied to ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
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¬ϕ ≡ ϕ ⊃ ⊥
ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ∀p : Prop . (ϕ ⊃ ψ ⊃ p) ⊃ p
ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ∀p : Prop . (ϕ ⊃ p) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ p) ⊃ p
∃x : α . ϕ ≡ ∀p : Prop . (∀x : α . ϕ ⊃ p) ⊃ p
One may therefore wonder why we take ∨ and ⊥ as primitive. The answer is that
if we defined the connectives by the above equations, then the inference rules
that could be derived for them would need to contain additional restrictions. For
instance, we would be able to derive only the following variants of ∨-introduction.
∨′i1 :
Γ ⊢ ϕ Γ ⊢ ψ : Prop
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
∨′i2 :
Γ ⊢ ψ Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
2.2 Equality, Recursive Definitions and Extensionality
It is well-known (see e.g. [7, Chapters 2, 6]) that since untyped λ-terms are
available together with the axiom β and usual rules for equality, any set of
equations of the following form has a solution for z1, . . . , zn, where the expres-
sions Φi(z1, . . . , zn, x1, . . . , xm) are arbitrary terms with the free variables listed.
z1x1 . . . xm = Φ1(z1, . . . , zn, x1, . . . , xm)
...
znx1 . . . xm = Φn(z1, . . . , zn, x1, . . . , xm)
In other words, for any such set of equations, there exist terms t1, . . . , tn such that
for any terms s1, . . . , sm we have ⊢ Eq (tis1 . . . sm) (Φi(t1, . . . , tn, s1, . . . , sm))
for each i = 1, . . . , n.
We will often define terms by such equations. In what follows we freely use
the notation t1 = t2 for ⊢ Eq t1 t2 , or for Γ ⊢ Eq t1 t2 when it is clear which
context Γ is meant. We use t1 = t2 = . . . = tn to indicate that Eq ti ti+1 may be
derived for i = 1, . . . , n− 1. We also sometimes write a term of the form Eq t1 t2
as t1 = t2.
It is worth stressing once again that there is no a priori syntactic distinc-
tion between terms, formulas, types, type assertions, etc. Formally, there are
only terms, but some terms are intuitively interpreted as formulas, types, etc. In
particular, the aforementioned method of defining terms by arbitrary recursive
equations may be applied to define terms which could be intuitively considered
to be formulas, e.g. we may define a term ϕ such that ϕ = ¬ϕ. Inconsistency is
avoided, because it will not be actually possible to prove ⊢Is ϕ : Prop, hence ϕ
will not really be a formula. In Is the inference rules serve the purpose of classi-
fying terms into different categories. This classification is not enforced a priori,
but instead it is a part of derivations in the logic.
In Is there is no rule for typing the equality Eq. One consequence is that
⊢ ¬(Eq t1 t2 ) cannot be derived for any terms t1, t2.4 For this reason Eq is more
like a meta-level notion of equality.
4 We mean this in a precise sense. This follows from our model construction.
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Definition 2.4. Leibniz equality Eql is defined as:
Eql ≡ λαλxλy.∀p : α→ Prop . px ⊃ py
As with =, we will often write t1 =α t2 to denote ⊢ Eqlα t1 t2 or Γ ⊢
Eqlα t1 t2 , or write t1 =α t2 instead of Eqlα t1 t2 .
Lemma 2.5. If Γ ⊢ α : Type then
– Γ ⊢ ∀x, y : α . (x =α y) : Prop,
– Γ ⊢ ∀x : α . (x =α x),
– Γ ⊢ ∀x, y : α . (x =α y) ⊃ (y =α x),
– Γ ⊢ ∀x, y, z : α . (x =α y) ∧ (y =α z) ⊃ (x =α z).
The system Is, as it is stated, is intensional with respect to Leibniz equality.
We could add the rules
ef :
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ ⊢ β : Type
∀f1, f2 : α→ β . (∀x : α . f1x =β f2x) ⊃ (f1 =α→β f2)
eb :
Γ ⊢ ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 Γ ⊢ ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ1
Γ ⊢ ϕ1 = ϕ2
to obtain an extensional variant eIs of Is. The system eIs is still consistent –
the model we construct for Is validates the above rules.
Lemma 2.6. ⊢eIs ∀x, y : Prop . (x =Prop y) ⊃ (x = y)
2.3 Induction and Natural Numbers
The system Is incorporates basic inductive types. In accordance with the termi-
nology from [8], an inductive type is basic if its constructors have no functional
arguments. This class of inductive types includes most simple commonly used
inductive types, e.g. natural numbers, lists, finite trees.
In our approach the types of constructors are encoded in the syntactic form
of the inductive type. For instance, if ι0, ι1 ∈ TI , then ι = µ(〈〉, 〈ι0, ι1, ⋆, ⋆〉) is
an inductive type with constructors: cι1 : ι and c
ι
2 : ι0 → ι1 → ι→ ι→ ι.
Lemma 2.7. If cιi ∈ C of arity ni has signature 〈ι1, . . . , ιni〉 then ⊢Is c
ι
i : ι
∗
1 →
. . .→ ι∗ni → ι.
Lemma 2.8. ⊢Is o
ι
i : ι→ Prop and ⊢Is ∀x : ι . o
ι
ix ⊃ (d
ι
i,jx : ι
∗
i,j)
Lemma 2.9. If ι ∈ TI then ⊢Is ∀x, y : ι . x =ι y ⊃ x = y.
We may define the type of natural numbers by Nat ≡ µ(〈〉, 〈⋆〉). We use the
abbreviations: 0 ≡ cNat1 (zero), 0 ≡ o
Nat
1 (test for zero), s ≡ c
Nat
2 (successor) and
p ≡ λx .Cond (0x) 0 (dNat2,1 x) (predecessor). The rules i
Nat
i and i
Nat,k
t become:
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ni :
Γ ⊢ t0 Γ, x : Nat, tx ⊢ t(sx) x /∈ FV (Γ, t)
Γ ⊢ ∀x : Nat . tx
n1t : Γ ⊢ 0 : Nat
n2t :
Γ ⊢ t : Nat
Γ ⊢ (st) : Nat
To simplify the exposition, we discuss some properties of our formulation of
inductive types using the example of natural numbers. Much of what we say
applies to other basic inductive types, with appropriate modifications.
The rule ni is an induction principle for natural numbers. An important prop-
erty of this induction principle is that it places no restrictions on t. This allows
us to prove by induction on natural numbers properties of terms about which
nothing is known beforehand. In particular, we do not need to know whether t
has a β-normal form in order to apply the rule ni to it. In contrast, an induction
principle of the form e.g.
n′i : ∀f : Nat→ Prop . ((f0 ∧ (∀x : Nat . fx ⊃ f(sx))) ⊃ ∀x : Nat . fx)
would be much less useful, because to apply it to a term t we would have to prove
t : Nat→ Prop beforehand. Examples of the use of the rule ni for reasoning about
possibly nonterminating general recursive programs are given in Sect. 4.
We may define a recursor R for natural numbers in the following way:
R = λghxy .Cond (0y) (gx) (hx (py) (Rg hx (py))) .
Note that we need the predecessor as a primitive, because otherwise a recursor
would not be definable.
Now +, −, ·, < and ≤, usually used in infix notation, are defined as follows.
x+ y = R(λx . x)(λxyz . sz)xy
x− y = R(λx . x)(λxyz . pz)xy
x · y = R(λx . 0)(λxyz . x+ z)xy
x ≤ y = 0(x− y)
x < y = (sx) ≤ y
Lemma 2.10. The following terms are derivable in the system Is:
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x+ y) : Nat, ∀x, y : Nat . (x− y) : Nat, ∀x, y : Nat . (x · y) : Nat,
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x ≤ y) : Prop, ∀x, y : Nat . (x < y) : Prop.
Lemma 2.11. ⊢Is ∀x, y : Nat . (x ≥ y) ∧ (x ≤ y) ⊃ (x =Nat y).
It is possible to derive Peano axioms for + and · defined as above.
Theorem 2.12. The following terms are derivable in the system Is:
– ∀x, y : Nat . (sx =Nat sy) ⊃ (x =Nat y),
– ∀x : Nat .¬(sx =Nat 0),
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– ∀x : Nat . (x+ 0 =Nat x),
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x+ sy =Nat s(x+ y)),
– ∀x : Nat . (x · 0 =Nat 0),
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x · (sy) =Nat (x · y) + x).
The following theorem shows that any function for which there exists a mea-
sure on its arguments, which may be shown to decrease with every recursive call
in each of a finite number of exhaustive cases, is typable in our system.
Theorem 2.13. Suppose Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . .∀xn : αn . ϕ1∨. . .∨ϕm, Γ ⊢ αj : Type
for j = 1, . . . , n, and for i = 1, . . . ,m: Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . .∀xn : αn . ti : β → . . .→ β
where β occurs ki+1 times, Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . ti,j,k : αk for j = 1, . . . , ki,
k = 1, . . . , n, x1, . . . , xn /∈ FV (f, α1, . . . , αn, β) and
Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . .∀xn : αn . ϕi ⊃ (fx1 . . . xn =
ti(fti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) . . . (fti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n)).
If there is a term g such that Γ ⊢ g : α1 → . . .→ αn → Nat and for i = 1, . . . ,m
Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . ϕi ⊃ (((fx1 . . . xn) : β) ∨
((gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ∧ . . . ∧
(gti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n) < (gx1 . . . xn)))
where x1, . . . , xn /∈ FV (g), then
Γ ⊢ f : α1 → . . .→ αn → β.
3 Conservativity and Consistency
In this section we show a sound embedding of ordinary classical higher-order
logic into Is, which we also conjecture to be complete. We have a completeness
proof only for a restriction of this embedding to first-order logic. We also give a
brief overview of the model construction used to establish consistency of Is.
First, let us define the system CPREDω of classical higher-order logic.
– The types of CPREDω are given by
T ::= o | B | T → T
where B is a specific finite set of base types. The type o is the type of
propositions.
– The set of terms of CPREDω of type τ , denoted Tτ , is defined as follows:
• Vτ , Στ ⊆ Tτ ,
• if t1 ∈ Tσ→τ and t2 ∈ Tσ then t1t2 ∈ Tτ ,
• if x ∈ Vτ1 and t ∈ Tτ2 then λx : τ1 . t ∈ Tτ1→τ2 ,
• if ϕ, ψ ∈ To then ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ To,
• if x ∈ Vτ and ϕ ∈ To then ∀x : τ . ϕ ∈ To,
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where for each type τ the set Vτ is a countable set of variables and Στ is
a countable set of constants. We assume that the sets Vτ and Σσ are all
pairwise disjoint. Terms of type o are formulas. As usual, we omit spurious
brackets and assume that application associates to the left. We identify α-
equivalent terms, i.e. terms differing only in the names of bound variables
are considered identical.
– The system CPREDω is given by the following rules and axioms, where ∆ is
a finite set of formulas, ϕ, ψ are formulas. The notation ∆,ϕ is a shorthand
for ∆ ∪ {ϕ}.
Axioms
• ∆,ϕ ⊢ ϕ
• ∆ ⊢ ∀p : o . ((p ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ p where ⊥ ≡ ∀p : o . p
Rules
⊃Pi :
∆,ϕ ⊢ ψ
∆ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ
⊃Pe :
∆ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ ∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ψ
∀Pi :
∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ∀x : τ . ϕ
x /∈ FV (∆), x ∈ Vτ ∀Pe :
∆ ⊢ ∀x : τ . ϕ
∆ ⊢ ϕ[x/t]
t ∈ Tτ
convP :
∆ ⊢ ϕ ϕ =β ψ
∆ ⊢ ψ
In CPREDω, we define Leibniz equality in type τ ∈ T by
t1 =τ t2 ≡ ∀p : τ → o . pt1 ⊃ pt2
The system CPREDω is intensional. An extensional variant E-CPREDω may be
obtained by adding the following axioms for all τ, σ ∈ T :
ePf : ∀f1, f2 : τ → σ . (∀x : τ . f1x =σ f2x) ⊃ (f1 =τ→σ f2)
ePb : ∀ϕ1, ϕ2 : o . ((ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ1)) ⊃ (ϕ1 =o ϕ2)
For an arbitrary set of formulas ∆ we write ∆ ⊢S ϕ if ϕ is derivable from a
subset of ∆ in system S.
We now define a mapping ⌈−⌉ from types and terms of CPREDω to terms
of Is, and a mapping Γ (−) from sets of terms of CPREDω to sets of terms of Is
providing necessary context. We assume that B ⊆ Σs and Στ ⊆ Σs for τ ∈ T ,
i.e. that all base types and all constants of CPREDω occur as constants in Is,
and also Vτ ⊆ Vs for τ ∈ T . The definition of ⌈−⌉ is inductive:
– ⌈τ⌉ = τ for τ ∈ B,
– ⌈o⌉ = Prop,
– ⌈τ1 → τ2⌉ = ⌈τ1⌉ → ⌈τ2⌉ for τ1, τ2 ∈ T ,
– ⌈c⌉ = c if c ∈ Στ for some τ ∈ T ,
– ⌈x⌉ = x if x ∈ Vτ for some τ ∈ T ,
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– ⌈t1t2⌉ = ⌈t1⌉⌈t2⌉,
– ⌈λx : τ . t⌉ = λx . ⌈t⌉,
– ⌈ϕ ⊃ ψ⌉ = ⌈ϕ⌉ ⊃ ⌈ψ⌉,
– ⌈∀x : τ . ϕ⌉ = ∀x : ⌈τ⌉ . ⌈ϕ⌉.
If ∆ is a set of formulas, then ⌈∆⌉ denotes the image of ⌈−⌉ on ∆. The set Γ (∆)
is defined to contain the following:
– x : ⌈τ⌉ for all τ ∈ T and all x ∈ FV (∆) such that x ∈ Vτ ,
– c : ⌈τ⌉ for all τ ∈ T and all c ∈ Στ ,
– τ : Type for all τ ∈ B,
– y : τ for all τ ∈ B and some y ∈ Vτ such that y /∈ FV (∆).
The last point is needed because in ordinary logic one always assumes that the
domains are non-empty.
Theorem 3.1. If ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ then Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉. The same holds if
we change CPREDω to E-CPREDω and Is to eIs.
The above theorem shows that Is may be considered an extension of ordinary
higher-order logic. This extension is essentially obtained by relaxing typing re-
quirements on allowable λ-terms. Type-checking is obviously undecidable in Is,
but the purpose of types in illative systems is not to have a decidable method
for syntactic correctness checks, but to provide general means for classifying
terms into various categories. In practice, one might still want to have a de-
cidable (and necessarily incomplete) method for checking correctness of some
designated type assertions. Such a method may be obtained by employing any
type-checking algorithm sound w.r.t. Is.5 However, the difference would be that
a priori type-checks would not be enforced in every situation. Occasionally, with
some more complex recursive functions, it might be convenient to forgo these
checks and reason about the types of such functions explicitly, using the rules
of Is.
Conjecture 3.2. If Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉ then ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ. The same holds if
we change CPREDω to E-CPREDω and Is to eIs.
We were able to prove this conjecture only for first-order logic. The system
of classical first-order logic (FOL) is obtained by restricting CPREDω in ob-
vious ways (leaving only one base type ι, disallowing λ-abstraction, allowing
quantification only over ι, and constants only of types ι, ι → . . . → ι → ι or
ι→ . . .→ ι→ o).
5 By soundness we mean that if the algorithm declares t : α correct (in a context Γ ),
then Γ ⊢Is t : α. Completeness is the implication in the other direction. The point
is that one would want some standard type-checking algorithms to be modified to
work on terms of Is, by declaring incorrect all type assertions not conforming to the
syntax of (a straightforward translation of) the assertions handled by the algorithm.
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Theorem 3.3. If I = Is or I = eIs then
∆ ⊢FOL ϕ iff Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢I ⌈ϕ⌉
Theorem 3.4. The systems Is and eIs are consistent, i.e. 6⊢Is ⊥ and 6⊢eIs ⊥.
This follows from Theorem 3.3, but we actually prove Theorem 3.4 first by
constructing a model, and then use this construction to show Theorem 3.3.
We now give an informal overview of the model construction. To simplify the
exposition we pretend Is allows only function types. Inductive types and sub-
types add some technicalities, but the general idea of the construction remains
the same. This overview is necessarily very brief. An interested reader is advised
to consult a technical appendix for more details.
An Is-model is defined essentially as a λ-model (see e.g. [7, Chapter 5]) with
designated elements interpreting the constants of Is, satisfying certain require-
ments. By JtKM we denote the interpretation of the Is-term t in a model M.
The conditions imposed on an Is-model express the meaning of each rule of Is
according to the intuitive semantics. For instance, we have the conditions:
(∀⊤) for a ∈ M, if JIsKM · a · JTypeKM = J⊤KM and for all c ∈ M such that
JIsKM · c · a = J⊤KM we have b · c = J⊤KM then J∀KM · a · b = J⊤KM,
(∀e) for a, b ∈M, if J∀KM ·a · b = J⊤KM then for all c ∈ A such that JIsKM · c ·a =
J⊤KM we have b · c = J⊤KM.
Here · is the application operation in the model.
We show that the semantics based on Is-models is sound for Is. Then it
suffices to construct a non-trivial (i.e. such that J⊤K 6= J⊥K) Is-model to es-
tablish consistency of Is. The model will in fact satisfy additional conditions
corresponding to the rules ef and eb, so we obtain consistency of eIs as well.
The model is constructed as the set of equivalence classes of a certain rela-
tion
∗
⇔ on the set of so called semantic terms. A semantic term is a well-founded
tree whose leaves are labelled with variables or constants, and whose internal
nodes are labelled with ·, λx or Aτ . The intuitive interpretation of nodes labelled
with · or λx is obvious. For semantic terms with the roots labelled with · and λx
we use the abbreviations t1t2 and λx.t, respectively. A node labelled with Aτ
represents universal quantification over a set of constants τ , i.e. it “represents”
the statement: for all c ∈ τ , tc is true. Such a node has one child for each
c ∈ τ . The relation
∗
⇔ will be defined as the equivalence relation generated by
a certain reduction relation ⇒ on semantic terms. The relation ⇒ will satisfy6:
(λx.t1)t2 ⇒ t1[x/t2], ∨⊤t⇒ ⊤, ∨⊥⊥ ⇒ ⊥, etc. The question is how to define⇒
for ∀t1t2 so that the resulting structure satisfies (∀⊤). One could try closing ⇒
under the rule:
– if Is t1Type
∗
⇒ ⊤ and for all semantic terms t such that Is t t1
∗
⇒ ⊤ we have
t2t
∗
⇒ ⊤, then ∀t1t2 ⇒ ⊤.
6 Substitution is defined for semantic terms in an obvious way, avoiding variable cap-
ture.
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However, there is a negative reference to ⇒ here, so the definition would not be
monotone, and we would not necessarily reach a fixpoint. This is a major problem.
We somehow need to know the range of all quantifiers beforehand. However, the
range (i.e. the set of all semantic terms t such that t1t
∗
⇒ ⊤) depends on the
definition of ⇒, so it is not at all clear how to achieve this.
Fortunately, it is not so difficult to analyze a priori the form of types of Is.
Informally, if t : Type is true, then t corresponds to a set in T , where T is defined
as follows, ignoring subtypes and inductive types, but instead introducing a base
type δ of individuals.
– δ,Bool ∈ T where Bool = {⊤,⊥} and δ is an arbitrary set of fresh constants.
– If τ1, τ2 ∈ T then τ
τ1
2 ∈ T , where τ
τ1
2 is the set of all set-theoretic functions
from τ1 to τ2.
We take the elements of T and
⋃
T \Bool as fresh constants, i.e. they may occur
as constants in semantic terms. The elements of
⋃
T are canonical constants. If
c ∈ ττ12 and c1 ∈ τ1 then we write F(c)(c1) instead of c(c1) to avoid confusion
with the semantic term cc1. We then define a relation ≻ satisfying:
– c ≻ c for a canonical constant c,
– if c ∈ ττ12 and for all c1 ∈ τ1 there exists a semantic term t
′ such that
tc1
∗
⇒ t′ ≻ F(c)(c1), then t ≻ c.
Intuitively, t ≻ c ∈ τ holds if c “simulates” t in type τ , i.e. t behaves exactly
like c in every context where a term of type τ is “expected”.
The relation ⇒ is then defined by transfinite induction in a monotone way.
It will satisfy e.g.:
– if t ≻ c ∈ τ ∈ T then Is t τ ⇒ ⊤,
– if t ≻ c1 ∈ τ1 and c ∈ τ
τ1
2 then ct⇒ F(c)(c1),
– Fun τ1 τ2 ⇒ τ
τ1
2 ,
– ∀τt⇒ t′ where the label at the root of t′ is Aτ , and for each c ∈ τ , t′ has a
child tc,
– t ⇒ ⊤ if the label of the root of t is Aτ , and all children of t are labelled
with ⊤,
– if tc
∗
⇒ t′c for all c ∈ τ ∈ T , the label of the root of t is Aτ , and {tc | c ∈ τ}
is the set of children of t, then t⇒ t′, where the label of the root of t′ is Aτ
and {t′c | c ∈ τ} is the set of children of t
′.
We removed negative references to⇒, but it is not easy to show that the resulting
model will satisfy the required conditions. Two key properties established in the
correctness proof are:
1. ⇒ has the Church-Rosser property,
2. if t2 ≻ c and t1c
∗
⇒ d ∈ {⊤,⊥} then t1t2
∗
⇒ d.
The second property shows that quantifying over only canonical constants of
type τ is in a sense equivalent to quantifying over all terms of type τ . This is
essential for establishing e.g. the condition (∀⊤).
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Both of these properties have rather intricate proofs. Essentially, the proofs
show certain commutation and postponement properties for ⇒, ≻ and other
auxiliary relations. The proofs proceed by induction on lexicographic products
of various ordinals and other parameters associated with the relations and terms
involved.
4 Partiality and General Recursion
In this section we give some examples of proofs in Is of properties of functions
defined by recursion. For lack of space, we give only informal indications of how
formal proofs may be obtained, assuming certain basic properties of operations
on natural numbers. The transformation of the given informal arguments into
formal proofs in Is is not difficult. Mostly complete formal proofs may be found
in a technical appendix.
Example 4.1. Consider a term subp satisfying the following recursive equation:
subp = λij .Cond (i =Nat j) 0 ((subp i (j + 1)) + 1) .
If i ≥ j then subp i j = i − j. If i < j then subp i j does not terminate. An
appropriate specification for subp is ∀i, j : Nat . (i ≥ j) ⊃ (subp i j = i− j).
Let ϕ(y) = ∀i : Nat . ∀j : Nat . (i ≥ j ⊃ y =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i− j). We
show by induction on y that ∀y : Nat . ϕ(y).
First note that under the assumptions y : Nat, i : Nat, j : Nat it follows from
Lemma 2.10 that (i ≥ j) : Prop and (y =Nat i − j) : Prop. Hence, whenever
y : Nat, to show i ≥ j ⊃ y =Nat i − j ⊃ subp i j = i − j it suffices to derive
subp i j = i − j under the assumptions i ≥ j and y =Nat i − j. By Lemma 2.9
the assumption y =Nat i− j may be weakened to y = i− j.
In the base step it thus suffices to show subp i j = i−j under the assumptions
i : Nat, j : Nat, i ≥ j, i− j = 0. From i− j = 0 we obtain 0(i− j), so j ≥ i. From
i ≥ j and i ≤ j we derive i =Nat j by Lemma 2.11. Then subp i j = i− j follows
by simple computation (i.e. by applying rules for Eq and appropriate rules for
the conditional).
In the inductive step we have ϕ(y) for y : Nat and we need to obtain
ϕ(sy). It suffices to show subp i j = i − j under the assumptions i : Nat,
j : Nat and sy = i − j. Because sy 6=Nat 0 we have i 6=Nat j, hence subp i j =
s(subp i (sj)) follows by computation. Using the inductive hypothesis we now
conclude subp i (sj) = i − (sj), and thus subp i (sj) =Nat i − (sj) by reflexiv-
ity of =Nat on natural numbers. Then it follows by properties of operations on
natural numbers that s(subp i (sj)) =Nat i − j. By Lemma 2.9 we obtain the
thesis.
We have thus completed an inductive proof of ∀y : Nat . ϕ(y). Now we use
this formula to derive subp i j = i − j under the assumptions i : Nat, j : Nat,
i ≥ j. Then it remains to apply implication introduction and ∀-introduction
twice.
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In the logic of PVS [9] one may define subp by specifying its domain precisely
using predicate subtypes and dependent types, somewhat similarly to what is
done here. However, an important distinction is that we do not require a domain
specification to be a part of the definition. In an interactive theorem prover based
on our formalism no proof obligations would need to be generated to establish
termination of subp on its domain.
Note that because domain specification is not part of the definition of subp,
we may easily derive ϕ ≡ ∀i, j : Nat . ((subp i j = i− j) ∨ (subp j i = j − i)).
This is not possible in PVS because the formula ϕ translated to PVS generates
false proof obligations [9].
Example 4.2. The next example is a well-known “challenge” posed by McCarthy:
f(n) = Cond (n > 100) (n− 10) (f(f(n+ 11)))
For n ≤ 101we have f(n) = 91, which fact may be proven by induction on 101−n.
This function is interesting because of its use of nested recursion. Termination
behavior of a nested recursive function may depend on its functional behavior,
which makes reasoning about termination and function value interdependent.
This creates problems for systems with definitional restrictions of possible forms
of recursion. Below we give an indication of how a formal proof of ∀n : Nat . n ≤
101 ⊃ f(n) = 91 may be derived in Is. Lemma 2.10 is used implicitly with
implication introduction.
Let ϕ(y) ≡ ∀n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101 − n ≤ y ⊃ f(n) = 91. We prove
∀y : Nat . ϕ(y) by induction on y.
In the base step we need to prove f(n) = 91 under the assumptions n : Nat,
n ≤ 101 and 101 − n ≤ y = 0. We have n =Nat 101, hence n = 101, and the
thesis follows by simple computation.
In the inductive step we distinguish three cases:
1. n+ 11 > 101 and n < 101,
2. n+ 11 > 101 and n ≥ 101,
3. n+ 11 ≤ 101.
We need to prove f(n) = 91 under the assumptions of the inductive hypothesis y :
Nat, ∀m : Nat .m ≤ 101 ⊃ 101 −m ≤ y ⊃ f(m) = 91, and of n : Nat, n ≤ 101
and 101− n ≤ (sy).
In the first case we have f(n+ 11) = n + 1 and n + 1 ≤ 101. Hence by the
inductive hypothesis we conclude 100−n ≤ y ⊃ f(n+1) = 91. From 101−n ≤ sy
we infer 100 − n ≤ y, and hence f(n + 1) = 91. Since n ≤ 100 it follows by
computation that f(n) = f(f(n+ 11)) = f(n+ 1) = 91.
In the second case n = 101 and the thesis follows by simple computation.
In the third case, from 101−n ≤ sy we infer 101−(n+11) ≤ y. Since n+11 ≤
101 we conclude by the inductive hypothesis that f(n + 11) = 91. Because n+
11 ≤ 101, so n ≤ 100, and by definition we infer f(n) = f(f(n + 11)) = f(91).
Now we simply compute f(91) = f(f(102)) = f(92) = f(f(103)) = . . . =
f(100) = f(f(111)) = f(101) = 91 (i.e. we apply rules for Eq and rules for the
conditional an appropriate number of times).
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This concludes the inductive proof of ∀y : Nat . ∀n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101−n ≤
y ⊃ f(n) = 91. Having this it is not difficult to show ∀n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ f(n) =
91.
Note that the computation of f(91) in the inductive step relies on the fact
that in our logic values of functions may always be computed for specific argu-
ments, regardless of what we know about the function, regardless of whether it
terminates in general.
5 Related Work
In this section we discuss the relationship between Is and the traditional illative
system Iω. We also briefly survey some approaches to dealing with partiality
and general recursion in proof assistants. A general overview of the literature
relevant to this problem may be found in [10].
5.1 Relationship with Systems of Illative Combinatory Logic
In terms of the features provided, the system Is may be considered an extension
of Iω from [3]. However, there are some technical differences between Is and tra-
ditional systems of illative combinatory logic. For one thing, traditional systems
strive to use as few constants and rules as possible. For instance, Iω has only two
primitive constants, disregarding constants representing base types. Because of
this in Iω e.g. Is = λxy . yx and Prop = λx .Type(λy.x), using the notation
of the present paper. Moreover, the names of the primitive constants and the
notations employed when discussing traditional illative systems are not in com-
mon use today. We will not explain these technicalities in any more detail. The
reader may consult [2,1,3] for more information on illative combinatory logic.
The system Iω from [3] is a direct extension of IΞ from [1] to higher-order
logic. The ideas behind Iω date back to [11], or even earlier as far as the general
form of restrictions in inference rules is concerned.
Below we briefly describe a system I ′ω which is a variant of Iω adapted to
our notation. It differs somewhat from Iω, mostly by taking more constants as
primitive, and thus having more rules and axioms. However, we believe that
despite these differences it is reasonably close to Iω and shares its essential
properties.
The terms of I ′ω are those of Is, except that we do not allow subtypes, induc-
tive types, Eq, Cond, ∨, ⊥ and ǫ. There are also additional primitive constants:
ω (the type of all terms), ε (the empty type) and ⊃. The axioms are: Γ, ϕ ⊢ ϕ,
Γ ⊢ Prop : Type, Γ ⊢ ε : Type, Γ ⊢ ω : Type, Γ ⊢ t : ω. The rules are: ∀i, ∀e,
∀t, ⊃i, ⊃e, ⊃t, →i, →e, →t, pi, and the rules:
conv :
Γ ⊢ ϕ ϕ =β ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
ε⊥ :
Γ ⊢ t : ε
Γ ⊢ ⊥
→p:
Γ ⊢ α : Type Γ, x : α ⊢ ((tx) : β) : Prop x /∈ FV (Γ, t)
Γ ⊢ (t : α→ β) : Prop
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Here ϕ =β ψ is a meta-level side-condition expressing β-equivalence of the
terms ϕ and ψ.
5.2 Partiality and Recursion in Proof Assistants
Perhaps the most common way of dealing with recursion in interactive theorem
provers is to impose certain syntactic restrictions on the form of recursive def-
initions so as to guarantee well-foundedness. For instance, the fix construct in
Coq allows for structurally recursive definitions whose well-foundedness must be
checked by a built-in automatic syntactic termination checker. Some systems, e.g.
ACL2 or PVS, pass the task of proving termination to the user. Such systems
require that a well-founded relation or a measure be given with each recursive
function definition. Then the system generates so called proof obligations, or
termination conditions, which state that the recursive calls are made on smaller
arguments. The user must solve, i.e. prove, these obligations.
The method of restricting possible forms of recursive definitions obviously
works only for total functions. If a function does not in fact terminate on some
elements of its specified domain, then it cannot be introduced by a well-founded
definition. One solution is to use a rich type system, e.g. dependent types com-
bined with predicate subtyping, to precisely specify function domains so as to
rule out the arguments on which the function does not terminate. This approach
is adopted by PVS [9]. A related method of introducing general recursive func-
tions in constructive type theory is to first define a special inductive accessibility
predicate which precisely characterises the domain [12]. The function is then
defined by structural recursion on the proof that the argument satisfies the ac-
cessibility predicate.
A different approach to dealing with partiality and general recursion is to
use a special logic which allows partial functions directly. Systems adopting this
approach are often based on variants of the logic of partial terms of Beeson
[13], [14]. For instance, the IMPS interactive theorem prover [15] uses Farmer’s
logic PF of partial functions [16], which is essentially a variant of the logic of
partial terms adapted to higher-order logic. In these logics there is an additional
definedness predicate which enables direct reasoning about definedness of terms.
The above gives only a very brief overview. There are many approaches to
the problem of partiality and general recursion in interactive theorem provers,
most of which we didn’t mention. We do not attempt here to provide a detailed
comparison with a multitude of existing approaches or give in-depth arguments
in favor of our system. For such arguments to be entirely convincing, they would
need to be backed up by extensive experimentation in proving properties of
sizable programs using a proof assistant based on our logic. No such proof assis-
tants yet exist and no such experimentation has been undertaken. In contrast,
our interest is theoretical.
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6 Conclusion
We have presented a system Is of classical higher-order illative λ-calculus with
subtyping and basic inductive types. A distinguishing characteristic of Is is that
it is based on the untyped λ-calculus. Therefore, it allows recursive definitions
of potentially non-terminating functions directly. The inference rules of Is are
formulated in a way that makes it possible to apply them even when some of
the terms used in the premises have not been proven to belong to any type.
Additionally, our system may be considered an extension of ordinary higher-
order logic, obtained by relaxing the typing restrictions on allowable λ-terms.
We believe these facts alone make it relevant to the problem of partiality and
recursion in proof assistants, and the system at least deserves some attention.
Some open problems related to Is are as follows.
1. Is Is conservative over higher-order logic (Conjecture 3.2)?
2. How to best incorporate a broader class of inductive types than just basic
inductive types, e.g. all strictly positive inductive types?
3. How far is it possible to broaden the class of allowed types and still have a
consistency proof in ZFC? For instance, in our model construction we could
try naively interpreting dependent types by set-theoretic cartesian products
when constructing the set T (see the overview of the consistency proof in
Sect. 3), but we would run out of sets. We conjecture that our construction
may be modified to incorporate dependent types in the way indicated if
we work in ZFC with one strongly inaccessible cardinal. This modification
should not pose any fundamental difficulties. Is it possible prove consistency
of Is with dependent types in plain ZFC?
4. Can the premises Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop in the rules c3 and c4 be removed?
5. Can the premise Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop in the rule c5 be removed?
Note that the premises Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop cannot be removed in c3, c4 and c5
simultaneously. Let ϕ be such that ϕ = ¬ϕ. Since ϕ ⊢ ⊥ and ¬ϕ ⊢ ⊥, it is easy
to see that we would have both ⊢ Condϕ⊤⊥ = ⊤ and ⊢ Condϕ⊤⊥ = ⊥.
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Appendix A Derived Rules for Implication
In all derivations in this and subsequent sections we omit certain steps and
rule assumptions, simplify inferences, and generally only give sketches of com-
pletely formal proofs, omitting the parts which may be easily reconstructed by
the reader.
Lemma A.1. If Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ, where x /∈ FV (Γ, ϕ, ψ) and y /∈ FV (ϕ), then Γ, x :
{y : Prop | ϕ} ⊢ ψ.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the length of derivation, using rule se to
show that Γ ⊢ x : {y : Prop | ϕ} implies Γ ⊢ ϕ, if x /∈ FV (Γ, ϕ) and y /∈ FV (ϕ).
Now the rules for ⊃ are derived as follows.
The rule
⊃i:
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ
follows by
Γ ⊢ Prop : Type
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop y /∈ FV (Γ, ϕ)
Γ, y : Prop ⊢ ϕ : Prop
Γ ⊢ {y : Prop | ϕ} : Type (a)
(a)
Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ, x : {y : Prop | ϕ} ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ∀x : {y : Prop | ϕ} . ψ
The rule
⊃e:
Γ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ψ
follows by
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop
. . .
Γ ⊢ {y : Prop | ϕ} : Type
. . .
Γ ⊢ ⊥ : Prop Γ ⊢ ϕ y /∈ FV (Γ, ϕ)
Γ ⊢ ⊥ : {y : Prop | ϕ} (b)
Γ ⊢ ∀x : {y : Prop | ϕ} . ψ (b)
Γ ⊢ ψ[x/⊥] (≡ ψ)
Finally, the rule
⊃t:
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ : Prop
Γ ⊢ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) : Prop
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follows by
Γ ⊢ Prop : Type
Γ ⊢ ϕ : Prop y /∈ FV (Γ, ϕ)
Γ, y : Prop ⊢ ϕ : Prop
Γ ⊢ {y : Prop | ϕ} : Type (c)
(c)
Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ : Prop
Γ, x : {y : Prop | ϕ} ⊢ ψ : Prop
(⋆)
Γ ⊢ (∀x : {y : Prop | ϕ} . ψ) : Prop
where we use Lemma A.1 to perform the inference (⋆).
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Appendix B Proofs for Section 2.3
Lemma B.1. If cιi ∈ C of arity ni has signature 〈ι1, . . . , ιni〉 then ⊢Is c
ι
i : ι
∗
1 →
. . .→ ι∗ni → ι.
Proof. Follows directly from rules iι,it and →i, and from axiom 4 (Γ ⊢ ι : Type
for ι ∈ TI).
Lemma B.2. ⊢Is o
ι
i : ι→ Prop and ⊢Is ∀x : ι . o
ι
ix ⊃ (d
ι
i,jx : ι
∗
i,j)
Proof. We first show ∀x : ι . oιix : Prop by induction. Once we have this, to derive
⊢Is o
ι
i : ι→ Prop it suffices to apply ∀e and→i. Because ⊢ o
ι
i(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) by ax-
iom 5 and ⊢ ¬(oιi(c
ι
jx1 . . . xnj )) for i 6= j by axiom 6, we have ⊢ (o
ι
i(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni)) :
Prop using rule pi, and ⊢ (oιi(c
ι
jx1 . . . xnj )) : Prop for i 6= j, using rules pi
and ⊃t2. It is then easy to see that the premises of the rule iιi are derivable for
t ≡ λx . oιix : Prop.
We show the second claim also by induction. Let Γi ≡ x1 : ι∗i,1, . . . , xni : ι
∗
i,ni
.
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m, where m is the number of constructors of ι. If i 6= k then
Γk ⊢ ¬(oιi(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk)). Hence, Γk, o
ι
i(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) ⊢ d
ι
i,j(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) : ι
∗
i,j by
applying rules ⊃e and ⊥e. Since ⊢ oιi : ι→ Prop has already been proven in the
previous paragraph, and Γk ⊢ (c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) : ι by Lemma B.1, we obtain Γj ⊢
(oιi(c
ι
jx1 . . . xnj )) : Prop. Thus Γk ⊢ o
ι
i(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) ⊃ (d
ι
i,j(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) : ι
∗
i,j)
by rule ⊃i. If i = k then di,j(cιkx1 . . . xnk) = xj and thus Γk, o
ι
i(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) ⊢
(di,j(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk)) : ι
∗
i,j by axiom 1 and rule eq. We then have ⊢ o
ι
i(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk),
hence ⊢ (oιi(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk)) : Prop by pi, and thus we may use ⊃i to derive Γk ⊢
oιi(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk) ⊃ (di,j(c
ι
kx1 . . . xnk)) : ι
∗
i,j . Therefore, by applying weakening we
derive the premises of rule iιi. Hence, we obtain our thesis by i
ι
i.
Lemma B.3. If ι ∈ TI then ⊢Is ∀x, y : ι . x =ι y ⊃ x = y.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction in the meta-theory on the structure
of ι ∈ TI .
Let ϕ(x) ≡ ∀y : ι . x =ι y ⊃ x = y and
Γ xi ≡ x1 : ι
∗
i,1, . . . , xni : ι
∗
i,ni , ϕ(xji,1 ), . . . , ϕ(xji,ki )
where ji,1, . . . , ji,ki are all indices j such that ιi,j = ⋆, as in the conditions for
rule iιi. It suffices to show Γ
x
i ⊢ ϕ(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then ⊢ ∀x, y :
ι . x =ι y ⊃ x = y is obtained by applying rule iιi.
For i = 1, . . . ,m, we prove Γ xi ⊢ ϕ(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni), i.e.
Γ xi ⊢ ∀y : ι . (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι y ⊃ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) = y
by induction on y (in the theory, i.e. applying rule iιi). Let
Γ yi,j ≡ y1 : ι
∗
i,1, . . . , yni : ι
∗
i,ni , ψi(yji,1 ), . . . , ψi(yji,ki )
where
ψi(y) ≡ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι y ⊃ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) = y.
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It therefore suffices to show
(⋆) Γ xi , Γ
y
i,j ⊢ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj ) ⊃ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) = (c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj )
for all i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,m.
Thus assume 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. By Lemma B.1 we have Γ xi ⊢
(cιix1 . . . xni) : ι and Γ
x
i , Γ
y
i,j ⊢ (c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj) : ι. Thus by Lemma 2.5 we obtain
(⋆⋆) Γ xi , Γ
y
i,j ⊢ ((c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj )) : Prop.
For k = 1, . . . , ni take
fk = λx .Cond (o
ι
ix) (d
ι
i,kx =ι∗i,k xk)⊥ .
Assume 1 ≤ k ≤ ni. Since oιi : ι → Prop by Lemma B.2, we obtain x :
ι ⊢ (oιix) ∨ ¬(o
ι
ix) by →e and the law of excluded middle. It is easy to derive
x : ι,¬(oιix) ⊢ fkx : Prop using the rules for Eq and Cond. By Lemma B.2 we
also have x : ι, oιix ⊢ d
ι
i,kx : ι
∗
i,k. We have Γ
x
i ⊢ xk : ι
∗
i,k by definition of Γ
x
i . Then
Γ xi , x : ι, o
ι
ix ⊢ (d
ι
i,kx =ι∗i,k xk) : Prop follows from Lemma 2.5. Using rule ∨e
it is now easy to derive Γ xi , x : ι ⊢ fkx : Prop. Since ⊢ ι : Type, we obtain
Γ xi ⊢ fk : ι→ Prop by rule →i.
Suppose i = j. Assume 1 ≤ k ≤ ni. Because Γ xi ⊢ fk : ι→ Prop, by definition
of =ι we have
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,i, (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
iy1 . . . yni) ⊢ (fk(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni)) ⊃ (fk(c
ι
iy1 . . . yni))
We have Γ xi ⊢ (fk(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni)) = (xk =ι xk). Hence Γ
x
i ⊢ fk(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni).
Because
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,i ⊢ (fk(c
ι
iy1 . . . yni)) = (yk =ι∗i,k xk)
we thus obtain
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,i, (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
iy1 . . . yni) ⊢ yk =ι∗i,k xk.
If ι∗i,k = ι then Γ
x
i ⊢ ∀y : ι . xk =ι y ⊃ xk = y and Γ
x
i , Γ
y
i,i ⊢ yk : ι. Hence
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,i ⊢ xk = yk. If ι
∗
i,k = ιi,k then by the inductive hypothesis in the meta-
theory we obtain ⊢ ∀x, y : ιi,k . x =ιi,k y ⊃ x = y, which again implies Γ
x
i , Γ
y
i,i ⊢
xk = yk, because Γ
x
i ⊢ xk : ιi,k and Γ
y
i,i ⊢ yk : ιi,k. Since 1 ≤ k ≤ ni was
arbitrary, we obtain
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,i, (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
iy1 . . . yni) ⊢ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) = (c
ι
iy1 . . . yni).
By (⋆⋆) and ⊃i we obtain (⋆) for i = j.
Suppose i 6= j. Assume 1 ≤ k ≤ ni. Because Γ xi ⊢ fk : ι→ Prop, by definition
of =ι we have
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,j , (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
jy1 . . . yni) ⊢ (fk(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni)) ⊃ (fk(c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj ))
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As in the case i = j we have Γ xi ⊢ (fk(c
ι
ix1 . . . xni)). Because i 6= j we have
Γ xi , Γ
ι
i,j ⊢ (fk(c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj)) = ⊥.
Therefore
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,j , (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
jy1 . . . yni) ⊢ ⊥.
By rule ⊥e we conclude
Γ xi , Γ
y
i,j , (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) =ι (c
ι
jy1 . . . yni) ⊢ (c
ι
ix1 . . . xni) = (c
ι
jy1 . . . ynj )
By (⋆⋆) and ⊃i we obtain (⋆) for i 6= j. This finishes the proof.
Lemma B.4. ⊢Is ∀x : Nat . ((0x) ∨ ∃y : Nat . x = (sy)).
Proof. Recall that x = sy stands for Eq x (sy) . Let ϕ(x) ≡ (0x) ∨ ∃y : Nat . x =
sy. We have the following derivation.
⊢ 00
⊢ ϕ(0)
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ sx = sx x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ x : Nat
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ ∃y : Nat . sx = sy
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ ϕ(sx)
⊢ ∀x : Nat . ((0x) ∨ ∃y : Nat . x = sy)
by ni
Lemma B.5. ⊢Is ∀x : Nat . (0x) ⊃ (x = 0).
Proof. Let ϕ(x) ≡ (0x) ⊃ (x = 0).
⊢ 00
⊢ (00) : Prop 00 ⊢ 0 = 0
⊢ ϕ(0) (a)
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ ¬(0(sx))
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ ¬(0(sx)) : Prop
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ 0(sx) : Prop
x : Nat, ϕ(x), 0(sx) ⊢ ⊥
x : Nat, ϕ(x), 0(sx) ⊢ sx = 0
x : Nat, ϕ(x) ⊢ ϕ(sx) (b)
(a) (b)
⊢ ∀x : Nat . (0x) ⊃ (x = 0)
Lemma B.6. The following terms are derivable in the system Is:
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x+ y) : Nat,
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x− y) : Nat,
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x · y) : Nat,
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x ≤ y) : Prop,
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x < y) : Prop.
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Proof. We give a sample proof for the first term.
x : Nat ⊢ (x+ 0) = ((λx . x)x)
x : Nat ⊢ (x+ 0) = x x : Nat ⊢ x : Nat
x : Nat ⊢ (x+ 0) : Nat (a)
x : Nat, y : Nat, (x+ y) : Nat ⊢ (x + y) : Nat
x : Nat, y : Nat, (x+ y) : Nat ⊢ (s(x+ y)) : Nat (b)
x : Nat, y : Nat, (x+ y) : Nat ⊢ x+ (sy) = s(x+ y) (b)
x : Nat, y : Nat, (x+ y) : Nat ⊢ (x+ (sy)) : Nat (c)
(a) (c)
x : Nat ⊢ ∀y : Nat . (x+ y) : Nat ⊢ Nat : Type
⊢ ∀x, y : Nat . (x+ y) : Nat
The second and third terms are derived in a similar way. The fourth and fifth
terms are derived from the second using Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.7. ⊢Is ∀x, y : Nat . (sx− sy = x− y)
Proof. We assume x : Nat and show ∀y : Nat . (sx− sy = x− y) by induction
on y. For y = 0 we have sx − s0 = p(sx − 0) = p(sx) = x = x − 0, and under
the assumptions x : Nat, y : Nat, (sx− sy) = x − y we may derive sx− s(sy) =
p(sx− sy) = p(x− y) = x− sy. By rule ni we obtain the thesis.
Lemma B.8. ⊢Is ∀x, y : Nat . (x ≥ y) ∧ (x ≤ y) ⊃ (x =Nat y).
Proof. Let ϕ(x) ≡ ∀y : Nat . (x ≥ y) ∧ (x ≤ y) ⊃ (x =Nat y). We proceed by
induction on x.
In the base step we need to show ϕ(0). We assume y : Nat and (0 ≥ y)∧ (0 ≤
y). From y ≤ 0 we have 0(y−0), i.e. 0y, and thus y = 0 by Lemma B.5. By rule pi
we have ((0 ≥ y) ∧ (0 ≤ y)) : Prop. Hence, we may use implication introduction
and then universal quantifier introduction to obtain ϕ(0).
In the inductive step we need to prove ϕ(sx) under the assumptions x : Nat
and ϕ(x). We assume further y : Nat and (sx ≥ y) ∧ (sx ≤ y). By Lemma B.4
there are two possibilities: y = 0 or ∃z : Nat . y = sz. If y = 0 then we easily
obtain sx = 0, which leads to a contradiction, from which we may derive x = y.
If y = sz then we have sx − sz = 0 and sz − sx = 0. By Lemma B.7 we
obtain x− z = 0 and z − x = 0. From the inductive hypothesis we have x =Nat
z, and hence x = z by Lemma B.3. Thus sx = sz = y. Since x : Nat and
y : Nat, it is not difficult to show that ((sx ≥ y) ∧ (sx ≤ y)) : Prop. We may
therefore use implication introduction and then universal quantifier introduction
to obtain ϕ(sx).
Theorem B.9. The following terms are derivable in the system Is:
– ∀x, y : Nat . (sx =Nat sy) ⊃ (x =Nat y),
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– ∀x : Nat .¬(sx =Nat 0),
– ∀x : Nat . (x+ 0 =Nat x),
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x+ sy =Nat s(x+ y)),
– ∀x : Nat . (x · 0 =Nat 0),
– ∀x, y : Nat . (x · (sy) =Nat (x · y) + x).
Proof. All proofs are easy. As an example we give an indication of how the
first term may be derived. We assume x : Nat, y : Nat and sx =Nat sy. From
sx =Nat sy we obtain sx = sy by Lemma B.3. We thus obtain x = p(sx) =
p(sy) = y. Since x : Nat and y : Nat we have x =Nat y by Lemma 2.5. We also
have (sx =Nat sy) : Prop by Lemma B.1 and Lemma 2.10. Therefore, we may
use implication introduction, and then universal quantifier introduction twice,
to show ∀x, y : Nat . (sx =Nat sy) ⊃ (x =Nat y).
Lemma B.10. Γ ⊢Is ∀x, y : Nat . x < sy ⊃ (x < y ∨ x = y)
Proof. Easy induction on x, recalling that x < y ≡ 0(x − y), using Lemma B.4
for the basis, and Lemma B.7 in the inductive step.
Lemma B.11. The following rule is admissible in Is.
n′i :
Γ ⊢ t0 Γ, y : Nat, ∀x : Nat . x < y ⊃ tx ⊢ ty x, y /∈ FV (Γ, t)
Γ ⊢ ∀x : Nat . tx
Proof. We show that if the premises are derivable, then so is Γ ⊢ ∀y, x : Nat . x <
y ⊃ tx. We achieve this by deriving the premises of the rule ni for ψ(y) ≡ ∀x :
Nat . x < y ⊃ tx. Since x : Nat, x < 0 ⊢ ⊥ and x : Nat ⊢ (x < 0) : Prop, we have
Γ ⊢ ψ(0). By our assumption that the second premise of n′i is derivable, we have
Γ, y : Nat, ψ(y) ⊢ ty. Let Γ1 ≡ Γ, y : Nat, ψ(y), x : Nat, x < sy. We show Γ1 ⊢ tx.
By Lemma B.10 we obtain Γ1 ⊢ x < y ∨ x = y. Since Γ1 ⊢ ∀x : Nat . x < y ⊃ tx
we have Γ1, x < y ⊢ tx. Since Γ1 ⊢ ty we have Γ1, x = y ⊢ tx. Using rule ∨e we
obtain Γ1 ⊢ tx. Since Γ, y : Nat, ψ(y), x : Nat ⊢ (x < sy) : Prop we have Γ, y :
Nat, ψ(y) ⊢ ∀x : Nat . x < sy ⊃ tx, i.e. Γ, y : Nat, ψ(y) ⊢ ψ(sy). By applying
rule ni we thus obtain Γ ⊢ ∀y, x : Nat . x < y ⊃ tx. Now Γ, x : Nat ⊢ sx : Nat
and Γ, x : Nat ⊢ x < sx, hence Γ, x : Nat ⊢ tx. Therefore Γ ⊢ ∀x : Nat . tx.
Theorem B.12. Suppose Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . ϕ1∨. . .∨ϕm, Γ ⊢ αj : Type
for j = 1, . . . , n, and for i = 1, . . . ,m: Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . .∀xn : αn . ti : β → . . .→ β
where β occurs ki+1 times, Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . ti,j,k : αk for j = 1, . . . , ki,
k = 1, . . . , n, x1, . . . , xn /∈ FV (f, α1, . . . , αn, β) and
Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . .∀xn : αn . ϕi ⊃ (fx1 . . . xn =
ti(fti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) . . . (fti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n)).
If there is a term g such that Γ ⊢ g : α1 → . . .→ αn → Nat and for i = 1, . . . ,m
Γ ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . ϕi ⊃ (((fx1 . . . xn) : β) ∨
((gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ∧ . . . ∧
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(gti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n) < (gx1 . . . xn)))
where x1, . . . , xn /∈ FV (g), then
Γ ⊢ f : α1 → . . .→ αn → β.
Proof. We derive the premises of the rule n′i for
ψ(x) ≡ ∀x1 : α1 . . .∀xn : αn . x =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ fx1 . . . xn : β.
We have Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ ϕ1∨. . .∨ϕm. Let Γi ≡ Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn, ϕi
for i = 1, . . . ,m. We first prove Γi, 0 =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊢ fx1 . . . xn : β. It suffices
to show
Γi, 0 =Nat (gx1 . . . xn), ((gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ∧ . . . ∧
(gti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n) < (gx1 . . . xn)) ⊢ fx1 . . . xn : β.
Since ⊢ g : α1 → . . .→ αn → Nat, by Lemma B.3 and ⊢ ¬(0(s(gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n)))
we have
Γi, 0 =Nat (gx1 . . . xn), ((gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ∧ . . . ∧
(gti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n) < (gx1 . . . xn)) ⊢ ⊥.
so our claim follows by ⊥e. Therefore Γi ⊢ 0 =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ (fx1 . . . xn : β)
by ⊢ g : α1 → . . .→ αn → Nat, Lemma 2.10 and ⊃i. Since
Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕm
by m− 1 applications of ∨e we obtain
Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ 0 =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ (fx1 . . . xn : β).
Because Γ ⊢ αi : Type for i = 1, . . . , n, we may apply ∀-introduction n times to
obtain Γ ⊢ ψ(0).
Let
Γ ′ ≡ Γ, y : Nat, ∀x : Nat . x < y ⊃ ψ(x)
and
Γ ′i ≡ Γ
′, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn, ϕi.
Because Γ ′, x1 : α, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ ϕ1∨. . .∨ϕm and Γ ′ ⊢ αi : Type for i = 1, . . . , n,
to derive the second premise of n′i for ψ, it suffices to show
Γ ′i ⊢ y =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ fx1 . . . xn : β
for i = 1, . . . ,m, apply ∨-elimination m − 1 times, and then ∀-introduction n
times. Let Γ ′′i ≡ Γ
′
i , y =Nat (gx1 . . . xn). Since
Γ ′i ⊢ (y =Nat (gx1 . . . xn)) : Prop
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it actually suffices to prove Γ ′′i ⊢ fx1 . . . xn : β and apply ⊃i. By the assumption
on g in the lemma, we have
Γ ′′i ⊢ ((fx1 . . . xn) : β) ∨ ((gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ∧ . . . ∧
(gti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n) < (gx1 . . . xn))
Let
Γ+i ≡ Γ
′′
i , (gti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ∧ . . . ∧ (gti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n) < (gx1 . . . xn)
It thus suffices to show Γ+i ⊢ fx1 . . . xn : β and apply rule ∨e. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ ki.
Since Γ+i ⊢ ti,j,k : αk for k = 1, . . . , n and Γ
+
i ⊢ g : α1 → . . . → αn → Nat, we
have Γ+i ⊢ (gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n) : Nat. Thus
Γ+i ⊢ (gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n) < y ⊃ ψ(gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n).
But Γ+i ⊢ y =Nat (gx1 . . . xn), Γ
+
i ⊢ y : Nat and Γ
+
i ⊢ (gx1 . . . xn) : Nat, so by
Lemma B.3 we obtain Γ+i ⊢ y = (gx1 . . . xn) and thus
Γ+i ⊢ (gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n) < (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ ψ(gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n).
By the rule ⊃e we have Γ
+
i ⊢ ψ(gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n), i.e.
Γ+i ⊢ ∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . (gti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n) =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ fx1 . . . xn : β.
Thus Γ+i ⊢ (fti,j,1 . . . ti,j,n) : β for j = 1, . . . , ki. Because Γ
+
i ⊢ ti : β → . . .→ β
where β occurs ki + 1 times, we have
Γ+i ⊢ (ti(fti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) . . . (fti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n)) : β.
But
Γ+i ⊢ fx1 . . . xn = ti(fti,1,1 . . . ti,1,n) . . . (fti,ki,1 . . . ti,ki,n)
so Γ+i ⊢ (fx1 . . . xn) : β.
Therefore, we have derived the premises of n′i for ψ, hence by Lemma B.11
we obtain Γ ⊢ ∀x : Nat . ψ(x), i.e.
Γ ⊢ ∀x : Nat∀x1 : α1 . . . ∀xn : αn . x =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ fx1 . . . xn : β.
Hence
Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn, x : Nat ⊢ x =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ fx1 . . . xn : β
so
Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ ∀x : Nat . x =Nat (gx1 . . . xn) ⊃ fx1 . . . xn : β.
Because Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ (gx1 . . . xn) : Nat, we easily obtain
Γ, x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn ⊢ fx1 . . . xn : β
and thus Γ ⊢ f : α1 → . . .→ αn → β.
30
APPENDIX C. SOUNDNESS OF THE TRANSLATION OF CPREDω
Appendix C Soundness of the Translation of CPREDω
In this section by τ , τ1, τ2, σ, σ1, etc. we denote types of CPREDω, by t, t1,
t2, etc. terms of CPREDω, by ϕ, ψ, etc. formulas of CPREDω, and by s, s1, s2,
etc. terms of Is. By T we denote the set of types of CPREDω. Below by ∆ we
denote an arbitrary set of formulas of CPREDω.
If t is a term of CPREDω then we use the notation Γ (t) for Γ ({t}). By Γ (∆,ϕ)
we denote Γ (∆∪{ϕ}). Below∆ denotes an arbitrary set of formulas of CPREDω.
Note that if ∆ ⊆ ∆′ then Γ (∆) ⊆ Γ (∆′), after possibly renaming some
variables y ∈ FV (Γ (∆)) such that y /∈ FV (∆). Because of Lemma 2.3, we may
assume without loss of generality that this implication always holds verbatim,
and also that Γ (t1t2) = Γ (t1, t2), Γ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) = Γ (ϕ, ψ), etc.
Lemma C.1. Γ (∆) ⊢Is ⌈τ⌉ : Type
Proof. Straightforward induction on the structure of τ , using rule →t.
Lemma C.2. If t ∈ Tτ then Γ (t) ⊢ ⌈t⌉ : ⌈τ⌉.
Proof. Induction on the structure of t, using rules →i, →e, ⊃t and ∀t, and
Lemma C.1 and weakening.
Lemma C.3. ⌈t1[x/t2]⌉ = ⌈t1⌉[x/⌈t2⌉]
Proof. Straightforward induction on the structure of t1.
Lemma C.4. If t1 →β t2 then Γ (t1, t2) ⊢Is ⌈t1⌉ = ⌈t2⌉.
Proof. Induction on the structure of t1, using the axiom β, the rules for Eq and
Lemma C.3.
Lemma C.5. For every τ ∈ T there is an Is-term s such that Γ (∆) ⊢Is s : ⌈τ⌉.
Proof. Induction on the structure of τ . If τ ∈ B then ⌈τ⌉ = τ and there exists y ∈
Vτ such that y /∈ FV (∆) and (y : τ) ∈ Γ (∆). Thus Γ (∆) ⊢ y : ⌈τ⌉. If τ = o then
⌈τ⌉ = Prop and e.g. Γ (∆) ⊢ ⊥ : ⌈τ⌉. If τ /∈ B ∪ {o} then τ = τ1 → τ2 for some
τ1, τ2 ∈ T . By the inductive hypothesis there exists an Is-term s2 such that
Γ (∆) ⊢ s2 : ⌈τ2⌉. Suppose x /∈ FV (s2, Γ (∆)). Then Γ (∆), x : ⌈τ1⌉ ⊢ s2 : ⌈τ2⌉.
Since ⌈τ⌉ = ⌈τ1⌉ → ⌈τ2⌉ and Γ (∆) ⊢ ⌈τ1⌉ : Type we obtain Γ (∆) ⊢ (λx . s2) : ⌈τ⌉
by Lemma C.1.
Theorem C.6. If ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ then Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉. The same holds if
we change CPREDω to E-CPREDω and Is to eIs.
Proof. Induction on the length of the derivation of ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ.
If ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ is an instance of the axiom ∆′, ϕ ⊢CPREDω ϕ, then obviously
Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉ by axiom 1 of Is. It is also easy to see that
Γ (∆, ∀p : Prop . ((p ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ p), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈∀p : Prop . ((p ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ p⌉.
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Suppose ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 is obtained from ∆,ϕ1 ⊢CPREDω ϕ2 by the
rule ⊃Pi . Then by the inductive hypothesis Γ (∆,ϕ1, ϕ2), ⌈∆⌉, ⌈ϕ1⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ2⌉. By
Lemma C.2 we have Γ (ϕ1) ⊢Is ⌈ϕ1⌉ : Prop. Hence by weakening and ⊃i we
obtain Γ (∆,ϕ1, ϕ2), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ1⌉ ⊃ ⌈ϕ2⌉, i.e. Γ (∆,ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ1 ⊃
ϕ2⌉.
Suppose ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ is a direct consequence of ∆ ⊢CPREDω ψ ⊃ ϕ and
∆ ⊢CPREDω ψ by the rule⊃Pe . By the IH and⊃e we have Γ (∆,ψ, ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉.
Note that Γ (∆,ψ, ϕ) = Γ (∆,ϕ), x1 : ⌈τ1⌉, . . . , xn : ⌈τn⌉ where {x1, . . . , xn} =
FV (ψ) \ FV (∆,ϕ), xi ∈ Vτi , and without loss of generality xi /∈ Γ (∆,ϕ). Since
xi /∈ FV (∆,ϕ) we have xi /∈ FV (⌈∆⌉, ⌈ϕ⌉). By Lemma C.5 there exist Is-terms
s1, . . . , sn such that Γ (∆,ϕ) ⊢Is si : ⌈τi⌉. By Lemma 2.3 we have
Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉, s1 : ⌈τ1⌉, . . . , sn : ⌈τn⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉.
By applying pi, ⊃i and ⊃e successively we obtain Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉.
Suppose ∆ ⊢CPREDω ∀x : τ . ϕ is obtained from ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ by rule ∀
P
i .
By the IH we have Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉. Since x /∈ FV (∆), we have Γ (∆,ϕ) =
Γ (∆, ∀x : τ . ϕ), x : ⌈τ⌉. By Lemma C.1 and weakening we have
Γ (∆, ∀x : τ . ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈τ⌉ : Type.
Hence Γ (∆, ∀x : τ . ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈∀x : τ . ϕ⌉ by ∀i and ⌈∀x : τ . ϕ⌉ = ∀x : ⌈τ⌉ . ⌈ϕ⌉.
Suppose∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ[x/t] is obtained from∆ ⊢CPREDω ∀x : τ . ϕ by rule ∀Pi .
We then have x /∈ FV (∆) and t ∈ Tτ . By the IH we have
Γ (∆, ∀x : τ . ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ∀x : ⌈τ⌉ . ⌈ϕ⌉.
If x /∈ FV (ϕ) then ϕ ≡ ϕ[x/t] and Γ (∆, ∀x : τ . ϕ) = Γ (∆,ϕ[x/t]). By Lemma C.5
there exists an Is-term s such that Γ (∆,ϕ[x/t]) ⊢Is s : ⌈τ⌉. By ∀e we obtain
Γ (∆,ϕ[x/t]), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ[x/t]⌉. If x ∈ FV (ϕ) then Γ (∆,ϕ[x/t]) = Γ (∆, ∀x :
τ . ϕ, t). By Lemma C.2 we have Γ (∆,ϕ[x/t]) ⊢ ⌈t⌉ : ⌈τ⌉, so by ∀e and Lemma C.3
we obtain Γ (∆,ϕ[x/t]), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢ ⌈ϕ[x/t]⌉.
Suppose ∆ ⊢CPREDω ψ is obtained from ∆ ⊢CPREDω ϕ by rule convP . Then
ϕ =β ψ. By the IH we have Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉. It suffices to show that if
ϕ →β ψ or ψ →β ϕ then Γ (∆,ψ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ψ⌉. If ϕ →β ψ then Γ (ψ) ⊂ Γ (ϕ)
and by Lemma C.4, rule eq and weakening we obtain Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢ ⌈ψ⌉. Note
that Γ (∆,ϕ) = Γ (∆,ψ), x1 : ⌈τ1⌉, . . . , xn : ⌈τn⌉ where {x1, . . . , xn} = FV (ϕ) \
FV (∆,ψ), xi ∈ Vτi . Hence, we may use the same argument as in the proof for
the rule ⊃Pe to obtain Γ (∆,ψ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ψ⌉. If ψ →β ϕ then Γ (ϕ) ⊆ Γ (ψ), and
by Lemma C.4, rule eq and weakening we obtain Γ (∆,ψ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢ ⌈ψ⌉.
To show that if ∆ ⊢E−CPREDω ϕ then Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢eIs ⌈ϕ⌉, it now suffices
to prove that the translations of the axioms ePf and e
P
b are derivable in eIs. This
is straightforward, using the rules ef , eb, eq, Lemma C.1 and Lemma 2.5.
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Appendix D Proofs for Section 4
In this section we give sketches of formal proofs for the examples in Sect. 4.
The formal derivations are slightly simplified, by omitting certain steps and rule
assumptions, simplifying inferences, and generally omitting some parts which
may be easily reconstructed by the reader. We also assume certain basic prop-
erties of operations on natural number and don’t derive them. These properties
may be derived from Theorem 2.12, Lemma 2.10 and the definitions of ≤ and −.
Lemma D.1. ⊢Is ∀i, j : Nat . (i ≥ j) ⊃ (subp i j = i− j)
Proof. Let ϕ(x) ≡ ∀i, j : Nat . i ≥ j ⊃ x =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i− j.
(a0.0)
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ i : Nat ⊢ ∀x, y : Nat . (x− y) : Nat
by 2.10
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ ∀y : Nat . (i − y) : Nat
(a0)
(a0.0) i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ j : Nat
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ (i− j) : Nat ⊢ 0 : Nat
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ (0 =Nat (i − j)) : Nat
by 2.5
Completely analogously, we obtain
(a1) i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ (i ≥ j) : Nat
Now let Γ0 ≡ i : Nat, j : Nat, i ≥ j, 0 =Nat i− j.
(a2)
Γ0 ⊢ 0 = i− j
by B.3
Γ0 ⊢ 0(i− j) Γ0 ⊢ i ≥ j
Γ0 ⊢ i =Nat j
by B.8
Γ0 ⊢ subp i j = 0 Γ0 ⊢ 0 = i− j
Γ0 ⊢ subp i j = i− j (a0)
i : Nat, j : Nat, i ≥ j ⊢ 0 =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i − j
(a)
(a1) (a2)
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ i ≥ j ⊃ 0 =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i− j ⊢ Nat : Type
⊢ ϕ(0)
Let Γ1 ≡ y : Nat, ϕ(y), i : Nat, j : Nat, sy =Nat i− j.
(b0.0)
Γ1 ⊢ i : Nat Γ1 ⊢ j : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ (i =Nat j) : Prop
by 2.5
(b0.1)
Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ i = j
by B.3
Γ1 ⊢ sy =Nat i− j
Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ sy =Nat i− i
Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ sy =Nat 0
Γ1 ⊢ y : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ (sy) : Nat
Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ sy = 0
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(b0)
(b0.1) Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ 00
Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ 0(sy) Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ ¬(0(sy))
Γ1, i =Nat j ⊢ ⊥ (b0.0)
Γ1 ⊢ ¬(i =Nat j)
(c0)
Γ1 ⊢ ϕ(y) Γ1 ⊢ i : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ j : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ (sj) : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ i ≥ (sj) ⊃ y =Nat i− (sj) ⊃ subp i (sj) = i− (sj)
(c1)
Γ1 ⊢ i ≥ j (b0)
Γ1 ⊢ i ≥ (sj) (c0)
Γ1 ⊢ y =Nat i− (sj) ⊃ subp i (sj) = i− (sj)
(c2)
Γ1 ⊢ sy =Nat i− j
Γ1 ⊢ i : Nat Γ1 ⊢ j : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ (i − j) : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ y : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ (sy) : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ sy = i− j
(c3)
Γ1 ⊢ i ≥ j (b0)
Γ1 ⊢ i > j
. . .
Γ1 ⊢ s(i− (sj)) = i− j
(c4)
(c3) (c2)
Γ1 ⊢ s(i− (sj)) = sy
Γ1 ⊢ p(s(i− (sj))) = p(sy)
Γ1 ⊢ i− (sj) = y
Γ1 ⊢ y =Nat i− (sj)
(c)
(b0)
Γ1 ⊢ subp i j = s(subp i (sj))
(c1) (c4)
Γ1 ⊢ subp i (sj) = i− (sj)
Γ1 ⊢ s(subp i (sj)) = s(i − (sj))
Γ1 ⊢ subp i j = s(i − (sj)) (c3)
Γ1 ⊢ subp i j = i− j
y : Nat, ϕ(y) ⊢ ϕ(sy)
(d)
(a) (c)
⊢ ∀y, i, j : Nat . i ≥ j ⊃ y =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i− j
by ni
(e)
. . .
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ (i − j) : Nat (d)
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ ∀k, l : Nat . k ≥ l ⊃ i− j =Nat k − l ⊃ subp k l = k − l
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ i ≥ j ⊃ i− j =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i− j
i : Nat, j : Nat, i ≥ j ⊢ i− j =Nat i− j ⊃ subp i j = i− j
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(f)
(e)
. . .
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ (i − j) : Nat
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ i− j =Nat i− j
i : Nat, j : Nat, i ≥ j ⊢ subp i j = i− j
(f)
. . .
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ (i ≥ j) : Prop
i : Nat, j : Nat ⊢ i ≥ j ⊃ subp i j = i− j ⊢ Nat : Type
⊢ ∀i, j : Nat . i ≥ j ⊃ subp i j = i− j
Lemma D.2. If f is a term such that
⊢Is f(n) = Cond (n > 100) (n− 10) (f(f(n+ 11)))
then
⊢Is ∀n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ f(n) = 91.
Proof. Let ϕ(y) ≡ ∀n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− n ≤ y ⊃ f(n) = 91.
(a0)
n : Nat, n ≤ 101, 101− n ≤ 0 ⊢ 101 ≤ n
n : Nat, n ≤ 101, 101− n ≤ 0 ⊢ n =Nat 101
by B.8
n : Nat, n ≤ 101, 101− n ≤ 0 ⊢ f(n) = f(101) = 101− 10 = 91
(a)
n : Nat ⊢ (101− n) : Nat
n : Nat ⊢ (101− n ≤ 0) : Prop (a0)
n : Nat, n ≤ 101 ⊢ 101− n ≤ 0 ⊃ f(n) = 91 n : Nat ⊢ (n ≤ 101) : Prop
n : Nat ⊢ n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− n ≤ 0 ⊃ f(n) = 91
⊢ Nat : Type
⊢ ϕ(0)
Let Γ0 ≡ y : Nat, ϕ(y), n : Nat, n ≤ 101, 101− n ≤ sy. Let Γ1 ≡ Γ0, n + 11 >
101, n < 101.
(b0.0)
Γ1 ⊢ n : Nat
Γ1 ⊢ (n+ 1) : Nat Γ1 ⊢ ϕ(y)
Γ1 ⊢ n+ 1 ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− (n+ 1) ≤ y ⊃ f(n+ 1) = 91
(b0)
(b0.0) Γ1 ⊢ n+ 1 ≤ 101
Γ1 ⊢ 101− (n+ 1) ≤ y ⊃ f(n+ 1) = 91
(b1)
Γ1 ⊢ 101− n ≤ sy
Γ1 ⊢ 101− (sn) = p(101− n)
Γ1 ⊢ s(101− (sn)) = 101− n
Γ1 ⊢ s(101− (n+ 1)) ≤ sy
Γ1 ⊢ 101− (n+ 1) ≤ y (b0)
Γ1 ⊢ f(n+ 1) = 91
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(b)
Γ1 ⊢ n+ 11 > 100
Γ1 ⊢ f(n+ 11) = n+ 11− 10 = n+ 1
Γ1 ⊢ n < 101
Γ1 ⊢ ¬(n > 100)
Γ1 ⊢ f(n) = f(f(n+ 11)) = f(n+ 1) (b1)
Γ1 ⊢ f(n) = 91
Let Γ2 ≡ Γ0, n+ 11 > 101,¬(n < 101).
(c)
Γ2 ⊢ n ≤ 101 Γ2 ⊢ ¬(n < 101)
Γ2 ⊢ n =Nat 101
Γ2 ⊢ f(n) = n− 10 = 101− 10 = 91
(d)
Γ0, n+ 11 > 101 ⊢ n : Nat
Γ0, n+ 11 > 101 ⊢ (n < 101) : Prop
Γ0, n+ 11 > 101 ⊢ n < 101 ∨ ¬(n < 101) (b) (c)
Γ0, n+ 11 > 101 ⊢ f(n) = 91
by ∨e
Let Γ3 ≡ Γ0, n+ 11 ≤ 101.
(e0.1)
Γ3 ⊢ ϕ(y)
Γ3 ⊢ n : Nat Γ3 ⊢ 11 : Nat
Γ3 ⊢ (n+ 11) : Nat
Γ3 ⊢ n+ 11 ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− (n+ 11) ≤ y ⊃ f(n+ 11) = 91
(e0.2)
(e0.1) Γ3 ⊢ n+ 11 ≤ 101
Γ3 ⊢ 101− (n+ 11) ≤ y ⊃ f(n+ 11) = 91
(e0)
(e0.2)
Γ3 ⊢ 101− n ≤ sy
Γ3 ⊢ 101− (n+ 11) ≤ y.
Γ3 ⊢ f(n+ 11) = 91
(e1)
Γ3 ⊢ n+ 11 ≤ 101 Γ3 ⊢ n : Nat . . .
Γ3 ⊢ n ≤ 100
Γ3 ⊢ f(n) = f(f(n+ 11)) (e0)
Γ3 ⊢ f(n) = f(91)
(e2.1)
Γ3 ⊢ f(91) = f(f(102)) Γ3 ⊢ f(102) = 92
Γ3 ⊢ f(91) = f(92)
(e2.2)
Γ3 ⊢ f(92) = f(f(103)) Γ3 ⊢ f(103) = 93
Γ3 ⊢ f(92) = f(93)
...
(e2.10)
Γ3 ⊢ f(100) = f(f(111)) Γ3 ⊢ f(111) = 101
Γ3 ⊢ f(100) = f(101) Γ3 ⊢ f(101) = 91
Γ3 ⊢ f(100) = 91
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(e2)
(e2.1) (e2.2)
Γ3 ⊢ f(91) = f(93) (e2.3)
Γ3 ⊢ f(91) = f(94) (e2.4)
...
...
Γ3 ⊢ f(91) = f(100) (e2.10)
Γ3 ⊢ f(91) = 91
(e)
(e1) (e2)
Γ3 ⊢ f(n) = 91
(f)
Γ0 ⊢ n : Nat
Γ0 ⊢ (n+ 11 > 101) : Prop
Γ0 ⊢ n+ 11 > 101 ∨ n+ 11 ≤ 101 (d) (e)
Γ0 ⊢ f(n) = 91
by ∨e
(g0)
y : Nat, ϕ(y), n : Nat ⊢ (101− n ≤ sy) : Prop (f)
y : Nat, ϕ(y), n : Nat, n ≤ 101 ⊢ 101− n ≤ sy ⊃ f(n) = 91
(g1)
y : Nat, ϕ(y), n : Nat ⊢ (n ≤ 101) : Prop (g0)
y : Nat, ϕ(y), n : Nat ⊢ n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− n ≤ sy ⊃ f(n) = 91
(g)
⊢ Nat : Type (g1)
y : Nat, ϕ(y) ⊢ ϕ(sy)
(h)
(a) (g)
⊢ ∀y, n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− n ≤ y ⊃ f(n) = 91
by ni
(i)
n : Nat ⊢ (101− n) : Nat (h)
n : Nat ⊢ ∀m : Nat .m ≤ 101 ⊃ 101−m ≤ 101− n ⊃ f(m) = 91
(j)
n : Nat ⊢ n : Nat (i)
n : Nat ⊢ n ≤ 101 ⊃ 101− n ≤ 101− n ⊃ f(n) = 91
n : Nat, n ≤ 101 ⊢ 101− n ≤ 101− n ⊃ f(n) = 91
n : Nat, n ≤ 101 ⊢ f(n) = 91
n : Nat ⊢ (n ≤ 101) : Prop (j)
n : Nat ⊢ n ≤ 101 ⊃ f(n) = 91 ⊢ Nat : Type
⊢ ∀n : Nat . n ≤ 101 ⊃ f(n) = 91
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Appendix E Semantics
In this appendix we define a semantics for Is and for eIs. This semantics will
be used in Appendix F to show consistency of Is and eIs.
Definition E.1. An Is-structure is a triple A = 〈A, ·, JK〉 where A is the domain
of A, · is a binary operation on A, and the interpretation JK : T×AV → A is a
function from Is-terms and valuations to A. We sometimes write ·A and JKA to
indicate that these are components of A.
A valuation v is a function v : V → A. We usually write JtKv instead of
JK(t, v), and we drop the subscript when obvious or irrelevant. To stress that
a valuation is associated with an Is-structure A, we sometimes call it an A-
valuation. By v[x/a] for a ∈ A we denote a valuation u such that u(y) = v(y) for
y 6= x and u(x) = a. We use the abbreviations T A = {a ∈ A | Jx : TypeKA{x 7→a} =
J⊤KA} and ιA = {a ∈ A | Jx : ιKA{x 7→a} = J⊤K
A} for ι ∈ TI . The symbols a, a
′, b,
b′, etc. denote elements of A, unless otherwise stated. We often confuse ⊤, ⊥, Is,
etc. with J⊤K, J⊥K, JIsK, etc., to avoid onerous notation. It is always clear from
the context which interpretation is meant.
Definition E.2. An Is-model is an Is-structure A satisfying the following re-
quirements:
(var) JxKv = v(x) for x ∈ V ,
(app) Jt1t2Kv = Jt1Kv · Jt2Kv,
(β) Jλx . tKv · a = JtKv[x/a] for every a ∈ A,
(fv) if v↾FV (t) = w↾FV (t) then JtKv = JtKw ,
(ξ) if for all a ∈ A we have Jλx . t1Kv ·a = Jλx . t2Kv ·a then Jλx . t1Kv = Jλx . t2Kv,
(pr) Is · a · Prop = ⊤ iff a ∈ {⊤,⊥},
(pt) JProp : TypeK = ⊤,
(it) Jι : TypeK = ⊤ for ι ∈ TI ,
(∀⊤) if a ∈ T A and for all c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ we have b · c = ⊤ then
∀ · a · b = ⊤,
(∀⊥) if a ∈ T A and there exists c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ and b · c = ⊥ then
∀ · a · b = ⊥,
(∀e) if ∀ · a · b = ⊤ then for all c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ we have b · c = ⊤,
(∀′e) if ∀ · a · b = ⊥ then there exists c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ and b · c = ⊥,
(∨1) ∨ · a · b = ⊤ iff a = ⊤ or b = ⊥,
(∨2) ∨ · a · b = ⊥ iff a = ⊥ and b = ⊥,
(⊃t2) if ⊃ ·a · b = ⊤ then a ∈ {⊤,⊥}, where ⊃= Jλxy . x ⊃ yK,
(⊥) if ⊥ = ⊤ then for all a ∈ A we have a = ⊤,
(→i) if f ∈ A, a ∈ T A and for all c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ we have
Is · (f · c) · b = ⊤, then Is · f · (Fun · a · b) = ⊤,
(→e) if Is · f · (Fun · a · b) = ⊤ and Is · c · a = ⊤ then Is · (f · c) · b = ⊤,
(→t) if a, b ∈ T A then Fun · a · b ∈ T A,
(s1) if Subtype ·a ·b ∈ T A, Is·c ·a = ⊤ and b ·c = ⊤, then Is·c ·(Subtype·a ·b) = ⊤,
(s2) if Is · c · (Subtype · a · b) = ⊤ then b · c = ⊤,
(s3) if Is · c · (Subtype · a · b) = ⊤ then Is · c · a = ⊤,
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(s4) if a ∈ T A and for all c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ we have b · c ∈ {⊤,⊥},
then Subtype · a · b ∈ T A,
(o1) oιi · (c
ι
i · a1 · . . . · ani) = ⊤ where o
ι
i ∈ O and c
ι
i ∈ C has arity ni,
(o2) oιi · (c
ι
j · a1 · . . . · anj ) = ⊥ where i 6= j, o
ι
i ∈ O, c
ι
j ∈ C has arity nj ,
(d1) dιi,j · (c
ι
i · a1 · . . . · ani) = aj where d
ι
i,j ∈ D and c
ι
i ∈ C has arity ni,
(i1) if for all i = 1, . . . ,m we have:
• for all b1, . . . , bni such that
∗ bj ∈ ι∗i,j
A for j = 1, . . . , ni, and
∗ a · bk = ⊤ for 1 ≤ k ≤ ni such that ιi,k = ⋆
we have a · (cιi · b1 · . . . · bni) = ⊤
then ∀ · ιA · a = ⊤, where cιi ∈ C has arity ni, ι ∈ TI , ι
∗
i,j = ιi,j if ιi,j ∈ TI ,
ι∗i,j = ι if ιi,j = ⋆, and ι = µ(〈ι1,1, . . . , ι1,n1〉, . . . , 〈ιm,1, . . . , ιm,mi〉),
(i2) if aj ∈ ι∗i,j
A for i = 1, . . . , ni then c
ι
i · a1 · . . . · ani ∈ ι
A, where cιi ∈ C
has arity ni, ι ∈ TI , ι
∗
i,j = ιi,j if ιi,j ∈ TI , ι
∗
i,j = ι if ιi,j = ⋆, ι =
µ(〈ι1,1, . . . , ι1,n1〉, . . . , 〈ιm,1, . . . , ιm,mi〉),
(ǫ) if for a ∈ T A there exists b ∈ A such that Is · b · a = ⊤ then Is · (ǫ · a) · a = ⊤,
(c1) Cond · ⊤ · a · b = a,
(c2) Cond · ⊥ · a · b = b,
(eq) Eq · a · b = ⊤ iff a = b,
An eIs-model is an Is-model which additionally satisfies:
(ef) if a, b ∈ T A, Is·f ·(Fun ·a ·b) = ⊤, Is·g ·(Fun ·a ·b) = ⊤, and for all c ∈ A such
that Is · c · a = ⊤, and all p ∈ A such that Is · p · (Fun · b ·Prop) = ⊤ we have
p·(f ·c) = p·(g·c), then for all p ∈ A such that Is·p·(Fun·(Fun·a·b)·Prop) = ⊤
we have p · f = p · g,
(eb) if ⊃ · a · b = ⊃ · b · a = ⊤ then a = b.
Here ⊃ = Jλxy . x ⊃ yK.
For a term ϕ and a valuation u we write A, u |= ϕ if JϕKAu = ⊤. Given a
set of terms Γ , we use the notation A, u |= Γ if A, u |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . We
drop the subscript A when obvious or irrelevant. We write Γ |=Is ϕ if for every
Is-model A and every valuation u, the condition A, u |= Γ implies A, u |= ϕ.
The notation Γ |=eIs ϕ is defined analogously. The subscript is dropped when
obvious from the context or irrelevant.
Note that every (nontrivial) Is-model is a λ-model. See e.g. [7, Chapter 5]
for a definition of a λ-model.
Lemma E.3. In every Is-model A the following conditions hold.
(∧1) ∧ · a · b = ⊤ iff a = ⊤ and b = ⊤,
(∧2) ∧ · a · b = ⊥ iff a = ⊥ or b = ⊥,
(∃⊤) if a ∈ T
A and there exists c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ and b · c = ⊤ then
∃ · a · b = ⊤,
(∃⊥) if a ∈ T A and for all c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ we have b · c = ⊥ then
∃ · a · b = ⊥,
(∃e) if ∃ · a · b = ⊤ then there exists c ∈ A such that Is · c · a = ⊤ and b · c = ⊤,
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(⊃1) ⊃ ·a · b = ⊤ iff a = ⊥, or a = b = ⊤,
(⊃2) ⊃ ·a · b = ⊥ iff a = ⊤ and b = ⊥,
(¬⊤) ¬ · a = ⊥ iff a = ⊤,
(¬⊥) ¬ · a = ⊤ iff a = ⊥.
Here ⊃= Jλxy . x ⊃ yK, ¬ = Jλx .¬xK, ∧ = Jλxy .¬((¬x) ∨ (¬y))K and ∃ =
Jλxy .¬(∀xλz .¬(yz))K.
Proof. Easy.
Lemma E.4. In every Is-model A, for any a ∈ T
A and b, c ∈ A such that
Is · b · a = ⊤ and Is · c · a = ⊤, the condition
(1) for all p ∈ A such that Is ·p · (Fun ·a ·Prop) = ⊤ we have ⊃· (p ·b) · (p ·c) = ⊤
is equivalent to
(2) for all p ∈ A such that Is · p · (Fun · a · Prop) = ⊤ we have p · b = p · c
where ⊃ = Jλxy . x ⊃ yK.
Proof. It is obvious from the definition of ⊃ and the conditions (→e) and (pr)
that (2) implies (1). We show that (1) implies (2). Let p ∈ A be such that
Is · p · (Fun · a · Prop) = ⊤ and let b, c ∈ A be such that Is · b · a = ⊤ and
Is · c · a = ⊤. By (→e) and (pr) we have p · b ∈ {⊤,⊥} and p · c ∈ {⊤,⊥}. If
p · b = ⊤ then we must have p · c = ⊤ as well, by definition of ⊃. If p · b = ⊥ then
it is easy to see that p′ = Jλx.¬(yx)K{y 7→p} also satisfies Is ·p
′ ·(Fun ·a ·Prop) = ⊤.
We have p′ · b = ⊤, which implies p′ · c = ⊤, which means that p · c = ⊥ by (¬⊥).
Theorem E.5. If Γ ⊢I ϕ then Γ |=I ϕ, where I = Is or I = eIs.
Proof. Induction on the length of derivation. All cases follow easily from appro-
priate conditions in the definition of an Is-model or from Lemma E.3. With the
rule ef we also need to use Lemma E.4.
For instance, suppose Γ ⊢ Eq (Condϕ t1 t2 ) (Condϕ t′1 t2 ) was obtained by
rule c3. By the inductive hypothesis we have Γ, ϕ |= Eq t1 t′1 and Γ |= ϕ : Prop.
Assume M, u |= Γ . We have M, u |= ϕ : Prop, so Jϕ : PropKMu = ⊤. By
condition (pr) we obtain JϕKMu ∈ {⊤,⊥}. Suppose JϕK
M
u = ⊤. Then M, u |=
Γ, ϕ, so JEq t1 t
′
1 K
M
u = ⊤. Hence by conditions (app), (eq) and (c1), we have
JCondϕ t1 t2 K
M
u = JCondϕ t
′
1 t2 K
M
u . By conditions (app) and (eq) we obtain
M, u |= Eq (Condϕ t1 t2 ) (Condϕ t′1 t2 ) . So suppose JϕK
M
u = ⊥. Then we obtain
the thesis by applying conditions (app), (c2) and (eq).
Other cases are established in a similar way.
Conjecture E.6. If Γ |=eIs ϕ then Γ ⊢eIs ϕ.
We do not attempt to prove the above conjecture in this paper, as it is not
necessary for establishing consistency of eIs, which is our main concern here. We
treat the semantics given merely as a technical device in the consistency proof.
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Appendix F Model Construction
In this appendix we construct a nontrivial eIs-model, thus establishing con-
sistency of the systems Is and eIs. The construction is parametrized by a set
of constants δ. We will use this construction in the next appendix to show a
complete translation of classical first-order logic into Is and eIs.
The construction is an adaptation and extension of the one from [3] for the
traditional illative system Iω. The proof is perhaps a bit easier to understand,
because we do not have to deal with certain oddities of traditional illative systems
from [3], like e.g. the fact that t : Prop is defined as equivalent to (λx . t) : Type
where x /∈ FV (t), using the notation of the present paper.
For two sets τ1 and τ2, we denote by τ
τ1
2 the set of all (set-theoretical) func-
tions from τ1 to τ2. Formally, f ∈ τ
τ1
2 is a subset of τ1 × τ2 such that for every
f1 ∈ τ1 there is exactly one f2 ∈ τ2 such that 〈f1, f2〉 ∈ f .
Definition F.1. The subset TI of Is-terms is defined inductively by the follow-
ing rule:
– for every cιi ∈ C of arity ni, if t1, . . . , tni ∈ TI then c
ι
it1 . . . tni ∈ TI .
The set K consists of unique fresh constants, one for each element of TI . By
c¯ιi(t¯1, . . . , t¯ni) ∈ K we denote the constant corresponding to c
ι
it1 . . . tni ∈ K.
Each basic inductive type ι ∈ TI determines in an obvious way a subset of TI
(the set of all terms generated by the constructors of ι, respecting argument
types), and thus it determines a subset ι¯ ⊆ K. Let T¯I = {ι¯ | ι ∈ TI}. Note that⋃
T¯I = K and ι¯1 ∩ ι¯2 = ∅ if ι1 6= ι2.
Let Bool = {t, f} and T0 = {δ,Bool, ∅}∪T¯I , where t and f are fresh constants.
We define Tn+1 as follows.
– If τ ∈ Tn and τ
′ ⊆ τ then τ ′ ∈ Tn+1.
– If τ1, τ2 ∈ Tn then τ
τ1
2 ∈ Tn+1.
The set of types is now defined by T =
⋃
n∈N Tn.
We define a notation τ (τ1,...,τn) inductively as follows:
– τ (τ1) = ττ1 ,
– τ (τ1,τ2,...,τn) = (τ (τ2,...,τn))τ1 .
We define the set of canonical constants as Σ = δ∪Bool∪K∪Σf , where Σf
contains a unique fresh constant for each function in
⋃
T . We denote the function
corresponding to a constant c ∈ Σf by F(c). To save on notation we often confuse
constants c ∈ Σf with their corresponding functions, and write e.g. c ∈ τ instead
of F(c) ∈ τ , for τ ∈ T . It is always clear from the context what we mean. Note
that if F(c) ∈ ττ12 then τ1 is uniquely determined. This is because F(c) is a
set-theoretical function, i.e. a set of pairs, so its domain is uniquely determined.
Note also that if F(c) ∈ ττ12 and F(c) ∈ τ
′
2
τ1 , then F(c) ∈ (τ2 ∩ τ ′2)
τ1 .
Let v, w ∈ Σ∗. We write v ⊑ w if w = vu for some u ∈ Σ∗, i.e. when v is a
prefix of w. We use the notation v ❁ w when v ⊑ w and v 6= w.
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Definition F.2. A Σ-tree T is a set of strings over the alphabet Σ, i.e. a subset
of Σ∗, satisfying the following conditions:
– if w ∈ T and v ⊑ w then v ∈ T (prefix-closedness),
– ⊑−1 is well-founded on T (no infinite branches).
A node of a Σ-tree T is any w ∈ T . We say that a node w ∈ T is a leaf if there
is no w′ ∈ T such that w ❁ w′. If w ∈ T is not a leaf, then it is an internal node.
The root of a Σ-tree is the empty string ǫ.
We say that T1 is a subtree of T2 if there exists w ∈ T2 such that T1 = {v ∈
Σ∗ | wv ∈ T2}.
Note that a relation ≤, defined by T1 ≤ T2 iff T1 is a subtree of T2, is a well-
founded partial order, because Σ-trees have no infinite branches. This allows us
to perform induction on the structure of a Σ-tree. We write T1 < T2 if T1 ≤ T2
and T1 6= T2.
The height h(T ) of a Σ-tree T is an ordinal defined by induction on the
structure of T .
– If T = ∅ then h(T ) = 0.
– If T 6= ∅ then h(T ) = supT ′<T (h(T
′) + 1).
Definition F.3. The set of constants Σ+ is defined as
Σ+ = Σ ∪ T ∪ {∀,∨, Is, Subtype,Fun,Eq,Cond,Choice,Type} ∪ C ∪ D ∪ O
where C, D and O are the sets of constructors, destructors and tests from the
definition of Is. Note that for each τ ∈ T we have τ ∈ Σ+ as a constant.
We use V + to denote a set of variables of cardinality at least the cardinality
of Σ∗.
The set of operation symbols Op is defined to contain the following:
– · ∈ Op,
– if x ∈ V + then λx ∈ Op,
– if τ ∈ T and τ 6= ∅ then Aτ ∈ Op and Sτ ∈ Op.
Intuitively, Aτ means “for all elements of τ satisfying . . . ”, and Sτ means “a
subtype of τ consisting of elements satisfying . . . ”. These will appear as node
labels in a Σ-tree representing a semantic term. A node labelled with e.g. Sτ
will have a child corresponding to each element of τ . The subtype represented
by this node will consist of those elements for which the corresponding child
reduces to t.
Definition F.4. A semantic term is a pair 〈Pos, κ〉, where Pos is a Σ-tree and
κ : Pos→ Op ∪Σ+ ∪ V + is a function such that:
– w ∈ Pos is a leaf iff κ(w) ∈ Σ+ ∪ V +,
– if κ(w) = λx then w0 ∈ Pos and wc /∈ Pos for c 6= 0,
– if κ(w) = · then w0, w1 ∈ Pos and wc /∈ Pos for c /∈ {0, 1},
– if κ(w) ∈ {Aτ, Sτ} then wc ∈ Pos iff c ∈ τ .
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In other words, semantic terms are possibly infinitely branching well-founded
trees, whose internal nodes are labelled with operation symbols Op, and leaves
are labelled with constants from Σ+ or variables from V +.
We usually denote semantic terms by t, t1, t2, etc. We write Pos(t) for the
underlying tree of t, and t|p instead of κ(p).
The height of a semantic term t, denoted h(t), is the height of its associatedΣ-
tree. When we say that we perform induction on the structure of a semantic term
we mean induction on h(t). By induction on an ordinal α and the structure of a
semantic term we mean induction on pairs 〈α, h(t)〉 ordered lexicographically.
A position in a semantic term t is a string w ∈ Pos(t). The subterm of t at
position p ∈ Pos(t), denoted t|p, is a semantic term 〈Pos
′, κ′〉 where:
– Pos′ = {w ∈ Σ∗ | pw ∈ Pos(t)},
– κ′(w) = κ(pw).
A variable x ∈ V + is free in a semantic term t if there exists p ∈ Pos(t) such
that t|p = x and for no p′ ⊑ p we have t|p = λx. A variable is bound if it is not
free.
We identify α-equivalent semantic terms, i.e. ones differing only in the names
of bound variables. We assume that no semantic term contains some variable
both free and bound. We use the symbol ≡ for identity of semantic terms up to
α-equivalence.
Substitution t[x/t′] for semantic terms is defined in an obvious way, avoiding
variable capture. In other words, we adopt the convention that whenever we
write a term of the form t[x/t′] we assume that no free variables of t′ become
bound in t[x/t′].
In this section, when we speak of terms we mean semantic terms, unless
otherwise stated. We often use abbreviations for semantic terms of the form
λx . t, t1t2, λx.(Fun x (t1t2)), etc. The meaning of these abbreviations is obvious.
Definition F.5. A rewriting system R is a set of pairs of semantic terms. We
usually write t1 → t2 ∈ R instead of 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ R. A term t is said to R-contract
to a term t′ at position p, denoted t →pR t
′, if p ∈ Pos(t) ∩ Pos(t′), the terms t
and t′ differ only in subterms at position p, and there exists t1 → t2 ∈ R such
that t|p ≡ t1 and t
′
|p ≡ t2. We write t→R t
′ if t→pR t
′ for some p ∈ Pos(t).
For each ordinal α, we define two relations ⇒αR and ≻
α
R by induction on the
ordinal α and the structure of t.
(a) If c ∈ Σ then c ≻αR c.
(b) If c ∈ ττ12 and for all c1 ∈ τ1 there exists t
′ such that tc1
∗ <α
⇒R t′ ≻
<α
R F(c)(c1),
then t ≻αR c.
(1) If t ≡ t′ or t→ǫR t
′ then t⇒αR t
′.
(2) If t1 ⇒αR t
′
1 and t2 ⇒
α
R t
′
2 then t1t2 ⇒
α
R t
′
1t
′
2.
(3) If t⇒αR t
′ then λx . t⇒αR λx . t
′.
(4) If t1 ⇒
α
R t
′
1 and t2 ⇒
α
R t
′
2 then (λx . t1)t2 ⇒
α
R t
′
1[x/t
′
2].
(5) If c ∈ Σ+, n ∈ N, ct′1 . . . t
′
n →
ǫ
R t and ti ⇒
α
R t
′
i for i = 1, . . . , n, then
ct1 . . . tn ⇒αR t.
APPENDIX F. MODEL CONSTRUCTION
(6) If t ≻<αR c1 ∈ τ1 and c ∈ τ
τ1
2 , then ct⇒
α
R F(c)(c1).
(7) If t ≻<αR c for some c ∈ τ ∈ T then Is t τ ⇒
α
R t.
(8) If t|ǫ ≡ t′|ǫ ≡ Aτ or t|ǫ ≡ t′|ǫ ≡ Sτ , and for all c ∈ τ there exists t′′ such that
t|c ⇒
α
R t
′′ ∗ <α⇒R t′|c, then t⇒
α
R t
′.
The notation⇒<αR is an abbreviation for
⋃
γ<α ⇒
γ
R, and
∗ <α
⇒R denotes the transi-
tive-reflexive closure of⇒<αR . The notation ≻
<α
R is an abbreviation for
⋃
γ<α ≻
γ
R.
We define the relations ⇒R and ≻R as the smallest fixpoint of the above
construction, i.e. by monotonicity of the definition there exists the least ordinal ζ
such that ⇒ζR=⇒
<ζ
R and ≻
ζ
R=≻
<ζ
R , and we take ⇒R=⇒
ζ
R, ≻R=≻
ζ
R. Note
that ω steps do not suffice to reach the fixpoint. In fact, the ordinal ζ will be
quite large.
We denote by
∗
⇒R the transitive-reflexive closure of ⇒R, and by
∗
⇔R the
transitive-reflexive-symmetric closure of ⇒R. The subscript is often dropped
when obvious from the context.
Notice that the relation⇒R encompasses an analogon of β-reduction, regard-
less of what the rules of R are. Intuitively, the relation ⇒R is a kind of parallel
reduction on semantic terms, parametrized by the rules of R.
Lemma F.6. If R ⊆ R′ then ⇒R⊆⇒R′ and ≻R⊆≻R′ .
Intuitively, and very informally, t ≻R c is intended to hold if c ∈ τ ∈ T
is a “canonical” object which “simulates” t in type τ . By c “simulating” t in
type τ we mean that c behaves in essentially the same way as t, modulo ⇒R,
whenever a term of type τ is “expected”. Let us give some examples to elucidate
what we mean by this. For instance, let c1 ∈ Nat
Nat = τ1, c2 ∈ δδ = τ2 be
two constants such that F(c1)(c) ≡ c for all c ∈ Nat and F(c2)(c) ≡ c for all
c ∈ δ. Note that by condition (6) in the definition of ⇒R and the fact that
c1 ≻R c1 and c2 ≻R c2 we have c1c ⇒R c for all c ∈ Nat and c2c ⇒R c for
all c ∈ δ. Now we have both λx . x ≻R c1 and λx . x ≻R c2, because λx . x
behaves exactly like c1 when given arguments of type Nat, and exactly like c2
when given arguments of type δ. The condition (6) ensures that λx.x and c1 will
be indistinguishable wherever a term of type τ1 is “expected”. For instance, if
d ∈ δτ1 then we have d(λx . x)⇒R F(d)(c1). In fact, we will later prove that, for
an appropriate rewriting system R, the conditions tc
∗
⇒R t′ ≻R c′ and r ≻R c
imply the existence of t′′ such that tr
∗
⇒R t′′ ≻R c′, where t is an arbitrary term.
Note that we may have c1 ≻R c2 with c1, c2 ∈ Σ, c1 6≡ c2 (i.e. c1 and c2
being two distinct canonical constants), if there does not exist a single τ ∈ T
such that c1, c2 ∈ τ . We will later show that this is not possible, for a rewriting
system R to be defined, if such a τ ∈ T does exist.
We will build our model from equivalence classes of
∗
⇔R on semantic terms,
for a certain rewriting system R to be defined below. One of the main problems
in the model construction is to ensure that the condition (∀e) of Definition E.2
holds. The problem is that condition (→i) needs to be satisfied as well, which
means that we cannot know a priori which terms t should satisfy Is t τ for a
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function type τ ∈ T , because this must depend on the definition of⇒R for (→i)
to hold. And we cannot use a conditional rule of the form
if for all t such that Is t τ
∗
⇒R t we have t1t
∗
⇒R t then ∀ τ t1 ⇒R t
because the definition would not be monotone. Our solution is to restrict quan-
tification to canonical constants only, and to define the relation ⇒R in such a
way as to ensure that for each term t with Is t τ
∗
⇒R t there exist a canonical
constant c ∈ τ and a term t′ such that t
∗
⇒R t′ ≻ c.
Definition F.7. Let χ be a choice function for the family of sets T \ {∅}. We
define a rewriting system R by the rules presented in Fig. 1.
The above is a circular definition because the condition in the rule for Eq
refers to the system R. Note, however, that this reference is positive. Formally,
we may therefore define a progression of rewrite systems Rα consisting of the
above rules, but each using as R the system R<α =
⋃
γ<αRγ . We note that
Rα ⊆ Rβ for α ≤ β and take R to be the least fixpoint.
From now on R refers to the rewriting system defined above, and the rela-
tions →, ⇒,
∗
⇒, etc. refer to →R, ⇒R,
∗
⇒R, etc. We write t1 →
p
≡ t2 if t1 →
p t2
or t1 ≡ t2.
The three simple lemmas below follow by an easy inspection of the definition
of R and of ⇒.
Lemma F.8. If c⇒ t where c ∈ Σ+, then t ≡ c or c ∈ C has arity 0.
Lemma F.9. If c ∈ Σ+, there exist s1, . . . , sn such that cs1 . . . sn is a left side
of a rule in R, and ct1 . . . tn ⇒α t, then there exist t′1, . . . , t
′
n such that ti ⇒
α t′i
for i = 1, . . . , n and ct′1 . . . t
′
n →
ǫ
≡ t.
Lemma F.10. If t→ǫ t1 and t→ǫ t2 then t1 ≡ t2.
Lemma F.11. The following conditions hold.
– If t1 →ǫRβ t
′
1 then t1[x/t2]→
ǫ
Rβ
t′1[x/t2].
– If t1 ⇒αRβ t
′
1 then t1[x/t2]⇒
α
Rβ
t′1[x/t2].
– If t1 ≻αRβ c then t1[x/t2] ≻
α
Rβ
c.
Proof. Induction on triples 〈β, α, h(t1)〉 ordered lexicographically.
We first show that t1 →ǫRβ t
′
1 implies t1[x/t2] →
ǫ
Rβ
t′1[x/t2]. The only non-
obvious case is when t1 ≡ Eq r1 r2 →ǫRβ t ≡ t
′
1 by virtue of r1
∗
⇔R<β r2. But then
by the inductive hypothesis (for smaller β) we obtain r1[x/t2]
∗
⇔R<β r2[x/t2].
This implies that t1[x/t2] ≡ Eq r1[x/t2] r2[x/t2] →ǫRβ t ≡ t
′
1[x/t2].
We show that t1 ⇒αRβ t
′
1 implies t1[x/t2] ⇒
α
Rβ
t′1[x/t2]. If t1 ≡ t
′
1 then
this is obvious. If t1 →ǫRβ t
′
1 then this follows from the previous condition. If
t1 ≡ cr1 . . . rn ⇒αRβ t
′
1, c ∈ Σ
+, cr′1 . . . r
′
n →
ǫ
Rβ
t′1, ri ⇒
α
Rβ
r′i, then ri[x/t2] ⇒
α
Rβ
r′i[x/t2] by the inductive hypothesis (because h(ri) < h(t1)). As in the previous
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Eq t1 t2 → t if t1
∗
⇔R t2
∀τ t → t′ where τ ∈ T , τ 6= ∅, t′
|ǫ
≡ Aτ and t′|c ≡ tc for c ∈ τ
Subtype τ t → t′ where τ ∈ T , τ 6= ∅, t′
|ǫ
≡ Sτ and t′|c ≡ tc for c ∈ τ
∀∅t → t
Subtype∅ t → ∅
t → t if t|ǫ ≡ Aτ and for all c ∈ τ we have t|c ≡ t
t → f if t|ǫ ≡ Aτ and there exists c ∈ τ such that t|c ≡ f
t → τ ′ if t|ǫ ≡ Sτ and for all c ∈ τ we have t|c ∈ {t, f},
and τ ′ = {c ∈ τ | t|c ≡ t}
Fun τ1 τ2 → τ
τ1
2 for τ1, τ2 ∈ T
Cond t t1 t2 → t1
Cond f t1 t2 → t2
∨tt → t
∨tt → t
∨ff → f
cιi t¯1 . . . t¯ni → c¯
ι
i(t¯1, . . . , t¯ni) if t¯1, . . . , t¯ni ∈ ι¯ ∈ T¯I
dιi,j(c¯
ι
i(t¯1, . . . , t¯ni)) → t¯j
dιi,j(c
ι
it1 . . . tni) → tj
oιi(c¯
ι
i(t¯1, . . . , t¯ni)) → t
oιi(c¯
ι
k(t¯1, . . . , t¯nk)) → f if i 6= k
oιi(c
ι
it1 . . . tni) → t
oιi(c
ι
kt1 . . . tnk ) → f if i 6= k
Choice τ → χ(τ ) if τ ∈ T , τ 6= ∅
Is τ Type → t for τ ∈ T
Fig. 1. The rules of the rewriting system R.
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paragraph, it also follows from the IH that cr′1[x/t2] . . . r
′
n[x/t2] →
ǫ
Rβ
t′1[x/t2].
Therefore t1[x/t2] ≡ cr1[x/t2] . . . rn[x/t2] ⇒αRβ t
′
1[x/t2]. All other cases follow
easily from the inductive hypothesis, and we omit them.
Now we prove that t1 ≻αRβ c implies t1[x/t2] ≻
α
Rβ
c. If t1 ≡ c then this
is obvious. Otherwise c ∈ ττ12 ∈ T and for all c1 ∈ τ1 there exists t
′
1 such
that t1c1
∗ <α
⇒Rβ t
′
1 ≻
<α
Rβ
F(c)(c1). But then by the IH we have t1[x/t2]c1
∗ <α
⇒Rβ
t′1[x/t2] ≻
<α
Rβ
F(c)(c1). Therefore t1[x/t2] ≻αRβ c.
Lemma F.12. If t2 ⇒α t′2 then t1[x/t2]⇒
α t1[x/t
′
2].
Proof. Induction on the structure of t1. If t1 ≡ x or x /∈ FV (t1) then this
is obvious. If t1
|ǫ ∈ {Aτ, Sτ} then by the inductive hypothesis t1|c[x/t2] ⇒
α
t1|c[x/t
′
2] for c ∈ τ . Therefore t1[x/t2] ⇒
α t1[x/t
′
2]. Other cases follow directly
from the inductive hypothesis in a similar fashion.
Lemma F.13. If t1 ⇒
α t′1 and t2 ⇒
α t′2 then t1[x/t2]⇒
α t′1[x/t
′
2].
Proof. Induction on α and the structure of t1.
If t1 ≡ t′1 then the claim follows from Lemma F.12. If t1 →
ǫ t′1 then we
consider possible forms of t1. Suppose t1 ≡ Eq r1 r2 →ǫ t ≡ t′1 by virtue
of r1
∗
⇔ r2. By Lemma F.11 we have r1[x/t2]
∗
⇔ r2[x/t2]. Hence t1[x/t2] ≡
Eq r1[x/t2] r2[x/t2] →ǫ t ≡ t′1[x/t
′
2]. Suppose t1 ≡ ∀τt →
ǫ t′1 where τ ∈ T ,
t′1
|ǫ ≡ Aτ , and for all c ∈ τ we have t′1|c ≡ tc. Then t[x/t2] ⇒
α t[x/t′2] by the
inductive hypothesis, and ∀τ(t[x/t′2])→
ǫ t′1[x/t
′
2] by Lemma F.11. Hence by con-
dition (5) in the definition of ⇒α we obtain t1[x/t2] ≡ ∀τ(t[x/t2]) ⇒α t′1[x/t
′
2].
Other cases are established in a similar manner.
If t1 ≡ (λy . r1)r2 ⇒α r′1[y/r
′
2] ≡ t
′
1 where x 6≡ y, r1 ⇒
α r′1 and r2 ⇒
α r′2,
then by the inductive hypothesis r1[x/t2] ⇒α r′1[x/t
′
2] and r2[x/t2] ⇒
α r′2[x/t
′
2].
Recall that by our implicit assumption that in t1[x/t2] no free variables of t2
become bound, we have y /∈ FV (t2), and hence y /∈ FV (t′2). Thus t1[x/t2] ≡
(λy . r1[x/t2])r2[x/t2]⇒α r′1[x/t
′
2][y/(r
′
2[x/t
′
2])] ≡ (r
′
1[y/r
′
2])[x/t
′
2] ≡ t
′
1[x/t
′
2].
If t1 ≡ cr1 . . . rn ⇒α t′1 where c ∈ Σ
+, ri ⇒α r′i for i = 1, . . . , n, and
cr′1 . . . r
′
n →
ǫ t′1, then cr
′
1[x/t
′
2] . . . r
′
n[x/t
′
2] →
ǫ t′1[x/t
′
2] by Lemma F.11 and
ri[x/t2] ⇒α r′i[x/t
′
2] by the inductive hypothesis. We thus conclude t1[x/t2] ≡
cr1[x/t2] . . . rn[x/t2]⇒α t′1[x/t
′
2].
If t1 ≡ Is t τ ⇒α t ≡ t′1 where t ≻
<α c for some c ∈ τ , then t[x/t2] ≻<α c by
Lemma F.11. Therefore t1[x/t2] ≡ Is t[x/t2] τ ⇒α t ≡ t′1[x/t
′
2].
If t1
|ǫ ≡ t′1
|ǫ ≡ Aτ and for all c ∈ τ there exists tc such that t1|c ⇒
α tc
∗ <α
⇒
t′1|c, then t1|c[x/t2]⇒
α tc[x/t
′
2] by the inductive hypothesis. By Lemma F.11 we
obtain tc[x/t
′
2]
∗ <α
⇒ t′1|c[x/t
′
2]. This implies that t1[x/t2]⇒
α t′1[x/t
′
2].
Other cases follow by analogous proofs.
Lemma F.14. If c ∈ Σ+, n ∈ N, ct1 . . . tn →ǫ t and ti ⇒α t′i for i = 1, . . . , n,
then there exists t′ such that ct′1 . . . t
′
n →
ǫ t′ and t⇒α t′.
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Proof. If ct1t2 ≡ Eq t1 t2 →ǫ t then t1
∗
⇔ t2. Since ⇒α⊆⇒, we have t′1
∗
⇔ t′2.
Thus Eq t′1 t
′
2 →
ǫ
t.
Suppose ct1t2 ≡ ∀τt2 →
ǫ t where τ ∈ T , t|ǫ ≡ Aτ , t|c ≡ t2c for c ∈ τ . We
have ∀τt′2 →
ǫ t′ where t′
|ǫ ≡ Aτ and t′|c ≡ t
′
2c for c ∈ τ . Since t2c ⇒
α t′2c, by
condition (8) in the definition of ⇒α we conclude that t⇒α t′.
If ct1 ≡ dιi,j(c
ι
ir1 . . . rni) →
ǫ rj ≡ t then cιir1 . . . rni ⇒
α t′1. By Lemma F.9
there exist r′1, . . . , r
′
ni such that rk ⇒
α r′k for k = 1, . . . , ni and c
ι
ir
′
1 . . . r
′
ni →
ǫ
≡ t
′
1.
If cιir
′
1 . . . r
′
ni ≡ t
′
1 then ct
′
1 ≡ d
ι
i,j(c
ι
ir
′
1 . . . r
′
ni)→
ǫ r′j and we are done. Otherwise
r′1, . . . , r
′
ni ∈ ι¯ and t
′
1 ≡ c¯
ι
i(r
′
1, . . . , r
′
ni). Thus ct
′
1 ≡ di,j(c¯
ι
i(r
′
1, . . . , r
′
ni))→
ǫ r′j .
Other cases are trivial or follow by a similar proof.
Definition F.15. We say that two binary relations on terms →1 and →2 com-
mute if t1 →1 t′1 and t2 →2 t
′
2 imply t
′
1 →
≡
2 t3 and t
′
2 →
≡
1 t3 for some term t3,
where →≡i is the reflexive closure of →i.
Lemma F.16. If ⇒α
′
and ⇒β
′
commute for all α′ ◦1 α and β′ ◦2 β, then
∗ ◦1α⇒
and
∗ ◦2β
⇒ , ⇒◦1α and
∗ ◦2β
⇒ , as well as
∗ ◦1α⇒ and ⇒◦2β, commute. Here ◦1, ◦2 ∈
{<,≤} and ⇒≤γ =⇒γ for γ ∈ {α, β}.
Proof. The proof is a simple tiling argument similar to the proof of the Hindley-
Rosen lemma, see e.g. [7, Chapter 3].
Lemma F.17. For all ordinals α, β the following conditions hold:
(i) ⇒α and ⇒β commute,
(ii) if t ≻α c and t⇒β t′ then t′ ≻α c,
(iii) if t ≻α c1, t ≻β c2 and c1, c2 ∈ τ ∈ T then c1 ≡ c2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on triples 〈α, β, h(t)〉 ordered lexicographically,
where in condition (i) the term t is such that t⇒α t1 and t⇒β t2 for some t1, t2.
Together with condition (ii) we also prove its dual, i.e. the condition with α
and β exchanged. We only give a proof for the original condition, but it is easy
to see that the dual condition follows by exactly the same proof but with α and β
exchanged.
We first show condition (i). Assume t ⇒α t1 and t ⇒β t2. We need to show
that there exists t′ such that t1 ⇒β t′ and t2 ⇒α t′. It is clear that it suffices to
consider only the situations when t⇒α t1 follows by condition (m) and t⇒β t2
follows by condition (n) in the definition of ⇒ for m ≤ n, provided that we
never use the inductive hypothesis with β increased, which is easily verified to
be the case. Indeed, then we may use exactly the same proofs, but with α and β
exchanged, to handle the cases when m > n.
If t ≡ t1 or t ≡ t2 then the claim is obvious. Suppose t ⇒α t1 follows
by condition (1) in the definition of ⇒α. Then t →ǫ t1. By Lemma F.10 it is
impossible that t ⇒β t2 follows by condition (1) in the definition of ⇒β , unless
t1 ≡ t2. Suppose that t⇒β t2 follows by condition (5). Then t ≡ cr1 . . . rn →ǫ t1,
ri ⇒β r′i and cr
′
1 . . . r
′
n →
ǫ t2. By Lemma F.14 there exists t
′ such that t1 ⇒β t′
and cr′1 . . . r
′
n →
ǫ t′. But by Lemma F.10 we have t′ ≡ t2. The only remaining
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possibility, when t ⇒α t1 follows by condtion (1), is that t ⇒β t2 follows by
condition (2). But then the claim follows from Lemma F.14.
Suppose t ≡ r1r2 ⇒α r′1r
′
2 ≡ t1 where r1 ⇒
α r′1 and r2 ⇒
α r′2. If t ⇒
β t2
follows by condition (2) then t2 ≡ r′′1 r
′′
2 where r1 ⇒
β r′′1 and r2 ⇒
β r′′2 . By the
inductive hypothesis (note that h(r1), h(r2) < h(t)) there exist q1, q2 such that
r′1 ⇒
β q1, r
′′
1 ⇒
α q1, r
′
2 ⇒
β q2 and r
′′
2 ⇒
α q2. Thus t1 ≡ r′1r
′
2 ⇒
β q1q2 and
t2 ≡ r
′′
1 r
′′
2 ⇒
α q1q2.
It is not possible that t ⇒β t2 follows by condition (3). If it follows by
condition (4) then r1 ≡ λx . s1, r′1 ≡ λx . s
′
1, s1 ⇒
α s′1, and t2 ≡ s
′′
1 [x/r
′′
2 ] where
s1 ⇒β s′′1 , r2 ⇒
β r′′2 . By the inductive hypothesis there exist q1 and q2 such
that s′1 ⇒
β q1, s
′′
1 ⇒
α q1, r
′
2 ⇒
β q2 and r
′′
2 ⇒
α q2. By condition (4) in the
definition of ⇒β we have t1 ≡ (λx . s′1)r
′
2 ⇒
β q1[x/q2]. By Lemma F.13 we
obtain t2 ≡ s′′1 [x/r
′′
2 ]⇒
α q1[x/q2].
If t ⇒β t2 follows by condition (5) then r1 ≡ cs1 . . . sn, si ⇒β s′′i , r2 ⇒
β r′′2
and cs′′1 . . . s
′′
nr
′′
2 →
ǫ t2. By inspecting the definition of R we see that in this case
cq1 . . . qm →ǫ r′1 is not possible for any q1, . . . , qm and any m ≤ n. By inspecting
the definition of ⇒α we thus see that r1 ⇒α r′1 is only possible when r
′
1 ≡
cs′1 . . . s
′
n and si ⇒
α s′i. By the inductive hypothesis there exist q1, . . . , qn+1 such
that s′′i ⇒
α qi, s
′
i ⇒
β qi for i = 1, . . . , n, and r
′′
2 ⇒
α qn+1, r
′
2 ⇒
β qn+1. Therefore
cs′1 . . . s
′
nr
′
2 ⇒
β cq1 . . . qn+1 and cs
′′
1 . . . s
′′
nr
′′
2 ⇒
α cq1 . . . qn+1. By Lemma F.14
there exists t′ such that t2 ⇒α t′ and cq1 . . . qn+1 →ǫ t′. Hence by condition (5)
also t1 ≡ cs′1 . . . s
′
nr
′
2 ⇒
β t′. See Fig. 2.
cs1 . . . snr2
α
+3
β
cs′1 . . . s
′
nr
′
2
β
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
cs′′1 . . . s
′′
nr
′′
2
α
+3❴❴❴ ❴❴❴
ǫ
cq1 . . . qnqn+1
ǫ
✤
✤
✤
t2
α
+3❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ ❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ t′
Fig. 2.
If t ⇒β t2 follows by condition (6) then r1 ≡ r′1 ≡ c ∈ τ
τ1
2 , r2 ≻
<β c1 ∈ τ1
and t2 ≡ F(c)(c1). By part (ii) of the inductive hypothesis we conclude that
r′2 ≻
<β c1. Therefore t1 ≡ cr′2 ⇒
β F(c)(c1) ≡ t2.
If t⇒β t2 follows by condition (7) then r1 ≡ Is s, r2 ≡ τ , r′1 ≡ Is s
′, s⇒α s′,
t2 ≡ t and s ≻<β c for some c ∈ τ ∈ T . By part (ii) of the inductive hypothesis
we have s′ ≻<β c. Therefore t1 ≡ Is s′ r2 ⇒β t ≡ t2. It is easy to see that it is
impossible that t⇒β t2 follows by condition (8).
Now suppose that t ⇒α t1 follows by condition (3). Then t ≡ λx . r and
t1 ≡ λx . r1 where r ⇒α r1. It is easy too see that the only possibility is that
t⇒β t2 follows by condition (3) as well. Then t2 ≡ λx . r2 where r ⇒β r2. By the
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inductive hypothesis there exists q such that r1 ⇒β q and r2 ⇒α q. Therefore
t1 ≡ λx . r1 ⇒β λx . q and t2 ≡ λx . r2 ⇒α λx . q.
Suppose that t ⇒α t1 follows by condition (4). Then t ≡ (λx . r1)r2 and
t1 ≡ r′1[x/r
′
2] where r1 ⇒
α r′1 and r2 ⇒
α r′2. It is easy to see that the only
possibility is that t ⇒β t2 follows by condition (4) as well. Then t2 ≡ r′′1 [x/r
′′
2 ]
where r1 ⇒
β r′′1 and r2 ⇒
β r′′2 . By the inductive hypothesis there exist q1 and q2
such that r′1 ⇒
β q1, r
′′
1 ⇒
α q1, r
′
2 ⇒
β q2 and r
′′
2 ⇒
α q2. Therefore by Lemma F.13
we obtain t1 ≡ r′1[x/r
′
2]⇒
β q1[x/q2] and t2 ≡ r′′1 [x/r
′′
2 ]⇒
α q1[x/q2].
Suppose that t⇒α t1 follows by condition (5). Then t ≡ cr1 . . . rn, ri ⇒
α r′i
and cr′1 . . . r
′
n →
ǫ t1. If t ⇒β t2 also follows by condition (5), then there exist
r′′1 , . . . , r
′′
n such that ri ⇒
β r′′i and cr
′′
1 . . . r
′′
n →
ǫ t2. By the inductive hypothesis
there exist q1, . . . , qn such that r
′
i ⇒
β qi and r
′′
i ⇒
α qi. Therefore cr
′
1 . . . r
′
n ⇒
β
cq1 . . . qn and cr
′′
1 . . . r
′′
n ⇒
α cq1 . . . qn. By Lemma F.14 there exist t
′
1 and t
′
2
such that t1 ⇒β t′1, t2 ⇒
α t′2, cq1 . . . qn →
ǫ t′1 and cq1 . . . qn →
ǫ t′2. But by
Lemma F.10 we have t′1 ≡ t
′
2. See Fig. 3.
cr1 . . . rn
α
+3
β
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Fig. 3.
It is easy to verify that it is not possible that t⇒β t2 follows by condition (6).
If t ⇒β t2 follows by condition (7), then we must have c ≡ Is, t1 ≡ t2 ≡ t. It is
not possible that t⇒β t2 follows by condition (8).
Suppose t ⇒α t1 follows by condition (6). Then t ≡ cr ⇒α F(c)(c1) ≡ t2
where c ∈ ττ12 and r ≻
<α c1 ∈ τ1. It is easily verified that the only possibility is
when t⇒β t2 follows by condition (6) as well. Then t2 ≡ F(c)(c′1) and r ≻
<β c′1
for some c′1 ∈ τ1. By part (iii) of the inductive hypothesis we obtain c
′
1 ≡ c1.
Hence t1 ≡ t2.
Suppose t⇒α t1 follows by condition (7). Then t ≡ Is r τ , t1 ≡ t, and t⇒β t2
may only follow by condition (7). But then we have t2 ≡ t ≡ t1.
Finally, suppose t ⇒α t1 follows by condition (8) and so does t ⇒
β t2.
Then e.g. t|ǫ ≡ t1|ǫ ≡ t2|ǫ ≡ Aτ , and for all c ∈ τ there exist tc and t′c such
that t|c ⇒
α tc
∗ <α
⇒ t1|c and t|c ⇒
β t′c
∗ <β
⇒ t2|c. By the inductive hypothesis
there exists r such that tc ⇒
β r and t′c ⇒
α r. By the inductive hypothesis and
Lemma F.16 there exist q1 and q2 such that t1|c ⇒
β q1, r
∗ <α
⇒ q1, t2|c ⇒
α q2 and
r
∗ <β
⇒ q2. Again, by the inductive hypothesis and Lemma F.16 there exists qc
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such that q1
∗ <β
⇒ qc and q2
∗ <α
⇒ qc. Hence for all c ∈ τ there exists q1 such that
t1|c ⇒
β q1
∗ <β
⇒ qc, and for all c ∈ τ there exists q2 such that t2|c ⇒
α q2
∗ <α
⇒ qc.
Let q be such that q|ǫ ≡ Aτ and q|c ≡ qc for c ∈ τ . By the above considerations
we have t1 ⇒β q and t2 ⇒α q. See Fig. 4.
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
tc
β
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
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Fig. 4.
Now we show condition (ii). Thus suppose t ≻α c and t ⇒β t′. If t ≡ c
then t′ ≡ c and thus t′ ≻α c. Otherwise c ∈ ττ12 and for all c1 ∈ τ1 there
exists r such that tc1
∗ <α
⇒ r ≻<α F(c)(c1). Then tc1 ⇒β t′c1 and we conclude
by part (i) of the inductive hypothesis and Lemma F.16 that there exists r′
such that r ⇒β r′ and t′c1
∗ <α
⇒ r′. By part (ii) of the inductive hypothesis
we obtain r′ ≻<α F(c)(c1). Thus for every c1 ∈ τ1 there exists r′ such that
t′c1
∗ <α
⇒ r′ ≻<α F(c)(c1). Hence t′ ≻α F(c)(c1). See Fig. 5.
tc1
β
∗ <α
+3 r
β
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤ ≻
<α F(c)(c1)
t′c1
∗ <α
+3❴❴❴ ❴❴❴ r ≻<α F(c)(c1)
Fig. 5.
It remains to show condition (iii). Thus suppose t ≻α c1 and t ≻
β c2 for
c1, c2 ∈ τ ∈ T . If τ ⊆ Bool, τ ⊆ δ or τ ⊆ ι¯ ∈ T¯I then t ≡ c1 ≡ c2 because in this
case t ≻α c1 and t ≻β c2 may only be obtained by condition (a) in the definition
of ≻. Otherwise τ ⊆ ττ12 and e.g. t ≻
α c1 is obtained by condition (b), hence
α > 0.
If c1 6≡ c2 then there exists c ∈ τ1 such that F(c1)(c) 6≡ F(c2)(c). There
exists t1 such that tc
∗ <α
⇒ t1 ≻<α F(c1)(c). If t ≡ c2 then by inspecting the
definitions we see that this is only possible when c2c⇒γ F(c2)(c′) ≻<α F(c1)(c)
where c ≻<γ c′ ∈ τ1 and γ < α. By condition (a) we have c ≻β c. Since
c, c′ ∈ τ1 and γ < α we conlcude by part (iii) of the inductive hypothesis
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that c ≡ c′. Thus F(c2)(c) ≻<α F(c1)(c). Obviously F(c2)(c) ≻β F(c2)(c) and
F(c2)(c),F(c1)(c) ∈ τ2, so again by part (iii) of the inductive hypothesis we
obtain F(c1)(c) ≡ F(c2)(c). Contradiction.
Thus assume that t ≻β c2 also follows by condition (b) in the definition
of ≻. Then there exists t2 such that tc
∗ <β
⇒ t2 ≻<β F(c2)(c). By part (i) of the
inductive hypothesis and Lemma F.16 there exists r such that t2
∗ <α
⇒ r and
t1
∗ <β
⇒ r. By part (ii) of the inductive hypothesis we have r ≻<α F(c1)(c) and
r ≻<β F(c2)(c). By part (iii) of the inductive hypothesis we obtain F(c1)(c) ≡
F(c2)(c). Contradiction. See Fig. 6.
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Corollary F.18. The relation ⇒ has the Church-Rosser property.
Definition F.19. The rank of a type τ ∈ T , denoted rank(τ), is the smallest
n ∈ N such that τ ∈ Tn. The canonical type of a canonical constant c ∈ Σ,
denoted τ(c), is defined as follows.
– If c ∈ δ then τ(c) = δ.
– If c ∈ Bool then τ(c) = Bool.
– If c ∈ ι¯ ∈ T¯I then τ(c) = ι.
– Otherwise let ττ12 ∈ T be such that c ∈ τ
τ1
2 and rank(τ2) ≤ rank(τ
′
2) for
every τ ′2 ∈ T such that c ∈ τ
′
2
τ1 . Then τ(c) = ττ12 . Note that there may be
more than one τ2 satisfying the above condition. In this case we arbitrarily
choose one of them, and it does not matter which.
The rank of a canonical constant c, denoted rank(c), is the rank of its canonical
type.
Lemma F.20. The following conditions hold.
– For all τ1, τ2 ∈ T we have rank(τ1), rank(τ2) < rank(τ
τ1
2 ).
– If c ∈ τ then rank(c) ≤ rank(τ).
Proof. For the first condition, note that rank(ττ12 ) > 0 and if τ
τ1
2 ∈ Tn+1 then
τ1, τ2 ∈ Tn.
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If τ(c) ∈ {δ,Bool}∪T¯I then the second condition is obvious. Otherwise τ(c) =
ττ12 , and if c ∈ τ then τ ⊆ τ
τ1
3 with rank(τ) ≥ rank(τ
τ1
3 ) and rank(τ2) ≤ rank(τ3).
Suppose rank(τ1) = n1, rank(τ2) = n2, rank(τ3) = n3. Then n2 ≤ n3, rank(c) =
max(n1, n2) + 1 and rank(τ) ≥ max(n1, n3) + 1. Thus rank(c) ≤ rank(τ).
Definition F.21. We write t % c if c ∈ ττ12 and for every c1 ∈ τ1 there exists tc1
such that for all t1 with t1 ≻ c1 we have tt1
∗
⇒ tc1 ≻ F(c)(c1). If for some c1 ∈ τ1
there is more than one term tc1 satisfying the above condition, then we fix one
arbitrarily, but globally, i.e. given t and c such that t % c we assume that tc1 is
uniquely determined for each c1 ∈ τ1, and it depends only on t, c and c1. Note
that if t % c then t ≻ c.
Let t ≻ c. The mutual rank of t and c, denoted rank(t, c), is defined by
induction on rank(c). If t ≡ c then rank(t, c) = 0. If t 6% c then rank(t, c) =
rank(c). If t % c but t 6≡ c then c ∈ ττ12 and rank(t, c) is defined by
rank(t, c) = sup
c1∈τ1
rank(tc1 ,F(c)(c1))
where tc1 is the term required by the definition of %, such that for all terms t1
with t1 ≻ c1 we have tt1
∗
⇒ tc1 ≻ F(c)(c1). Note that rank(t, c) ≤ rank(c), and
if t % c then rank(t, c) < rank(c).
Two positions p1, p2 ∈ Σ∗ are parallel if neither p1 ⊑ p2 nor p2 ⊑ p1. We
write t1 ≫n t2 if there exists a set P ⊆ Pos(t1) ∩ Pos(t2) of pairwise parallel
positions such that for p ∈ P we have t1|p ≻ t2|p and t1|p 6≡ t2|p, no free variables
of t1|p become bound in t1, for every p ∈ Pos(t1) \ P we have p ∈ Pos(t2) and
t1
|p ≡ t2
|p, and rankP (t1, t2) ≤ n, where rankP (t1, t2) = supp∈P rank(t1|p, t2|p).
We write t1 ≫<n t2 if the same conditions hold except that rankP (t1, t2) < n.
We write t1 ≫ t2 if t1 ≫n t2 for some n ∈ N.
Lemma F.22. If t1 ≫n t′1, t2 ≫
n t′2 and x /∈ FV (t1|p) for all p ∈ P1, where P1
is the set of positions required by the definition of t1 ≫n t′1, then t1[x/t2] ≫
n
t′1[x/t
′
2].
Proof. Let P2 be the set of positions required by the definition of t2 ≫n t′2. Take
P = P1 ∪ {p ∈ Pos(t1[x/t2]) | p = p1p2, t1|p1 ≡ x, p2 ∈ P2}
as the set of positions required by the definition of t1[x/t2]≫n t′1[x/t
′
2].
Lemma F.23. The following conditions hold.
(i) If t1 ≫n t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2 then t1
∗
⇒ t′1 ≫
n t′2.
(ii) If t1 ≫n t′1 and t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′1 then there exists t
′
2 such that t
′
2
∗
⇒ t1 and t′2 ≫
n t2.
(iii) If t1 ≫
n t2 ≻
α
Rβ
c then t1 ≻ c.
Proof. Induction on tuples 〈n, β, α, h(t2)〉 ordered lexicographically.
We first show condition (i). Thus suppose t1 ≫n t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2. We consider
possible forms of t2 according to the definition of ⇒.
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If t2 ≡ t′2 then the claim is obvious. If t2 →
ǫ
Rβ
t′2 and t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′2 follows
by condition (1) in the definition of ⇒, then the only non-obvious case is when
t2 ≡ Eq r1 r2 →ǫRβ t ≡ t
′
2. Then r1
∗
⇔R<β r2 and t1 ≡ Eq r
′
1 r
′
2 where r
′
1 ≫
n r1
and r′2 ≫
n r2. It follows from parts (i) and (ii) of the inductive hypothesis that
r′1
∗
⇔ r′2. Thus t1 ⇒ t ≡ t
′
2.
If t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2 follows by condition (2) then t2 ≡ r1r2, t
′
2 ≡ r
′
1r
′
2, r1 ⇒
α
Rβ
r′1
and r2 ⇒αRβ r
′
2. We must also have t1 ≡ q1q2 where q1 ≫
n r1 and q2 ≫n r2. By
the inductive hypothesis (h(r1), h(r2) < h(t2)) there exist q
′
1 and q
′
2 such that
q1
∗
⇒ q′1, q2
∗
⇒ q′2, q
′
1 ≫
n r′1, q
′
2 ≫
n r′2. Thus t1 ≡ q1q2
∗
⇒ q′1q
′
2 ≫
n r′1r
′
2 ≡ t
′
2. If
t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2 follows by condition (3) then the argument is analogous.
Suppose t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′2 follows by condition (4). Then t2 ≡ (λx . r1)r2 and t
′
2 ≡
r′1[x/r
′
2] where r1 ⇒
α
Rβ
r′1 and r2 ⇒
α
Rβ
r′2. We must also have t1 ≡ (λx . q1)q2
where q1 ≫
n r1 and q2 ≫
n r2. By the inductive hypothesis there exist q
′
1 and q
′
2
such that q1
∗
⇒ q′1, q2
∗
⇒ q′2, q
′
1 ≫
n r′1, q
′
2 ≫
n r′2. By Lemma F.22 we obtain
q′1[x/q
′
2]≫
n r′1[x/r
′
2]. Thus t1 ≡ (λx . q1)q2
∗
⇒ q′1[x/q
′
2]≫
n r′1[x/r
′
2] ≡ t
′
2.
Suppose t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′2 follows by condition (5). Then t2 ≡ cr1 . . . rm, ri ⇒
α
Rβ
r′i,
cr′1 . . . r
′
m →
ǫ
Rβ
t′2. By the definition of Rβ , the constant c is not a canonical
constant. This implies that t1 ≡ cq1 . . . qm where qi ≫n ri. By the inductive
hypothesis (h(ri) < h(t2)) there exist q
′
1, . . . , q
′
m such that q
′
i ≫
n r′i and qi
∗
⇒ q′i.
Thus cq′1 . . . q
′
m ≫
n cr′1 . . . r
′
m →
ǫ
Rβ
t′2. But we have already verified in this
inductive step that this implies that there exists t′1 such that cq
′
1 . . . q
′
m
∗
⇒ t′1 ≫
n
t′2. Therefore t1 ≡ cq1 . . . qm
∗
⇒ cq′1 . . . qm
∗
⇒ t′1 ≫
n t′2.
Suppose t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2 follows by condition (6). Then t2 ≡ cr
′
2, t
′
2 ≡ c2 ≡
F(c)(c1), r
′
2 ≻
<α
Rβ
c1 ∈ τ1, τ(c) = τ
τ1
2 for some τ2 ∈ T . We also have t1 ≡
r1r2 where r1 ≫
n c, hence r1 ≻ c, and r2 ≫
n r′2 ≻
<α
Rβ
c1. By part (iii) of
the inductive hypothesis we obtain r2 ≻ c1. First assume that r1 ≡ c. Then
t1 ≡ r1r2 ≡ cr2 ⇒ F(c)(c1) ≡ t′2 by virtue of r2 ≻ c1, and we are done. So
suppose r1 6≡ c. If r1 % c then let q be the term required by the definition
of %, such that for every term r with r ≻ c1 we have r1r
∗
⇒ q ≻ c2. Then
rank(q, c2) ≤ rank(r1, c) ≤ n, and t1 ≡ r1r2
∗
⇒ q ≻ c2, because r2 ≻ c1. So
t1
∗
⇒ q ≫n c2 ≡ t′2, which is our claim. Therefore suppose r1 6≡ c and r1 6% c.
Then we have rank(r2, c1) ≤ rank(c1) ≤ rank(τ1) < rank(c) = rank(r1, c) ≤ n
by Lemma F.20. Thus r1r2 ≫<n r1c1. By the fact that r1 ≻ c there exists t
such that r1c1
∗
⇒ t ≻ F(c)(c1). By part (i) of the inductive hypothesis there
exists t′ such that r1r2
∗
⇒ t′ ≫<n t. Let c2 ≡ F(c)(c1). We have t′ ≫<n
t ≻ c2, so by part (iii) of the inductive hypothesis we obtain t′ ≻ c2. Since
rank(t′, c2) ≤ rank(c2) ≤ rank(τ2) < rank(c) = rank(r1, c) ≤ n, we conclude
that t1 ≡ r1r2
∗
⇒ t′ ≫n c2 ≡ t′2.
Suppose t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2 follows by condition (7). Then t2 ≡ Is r2 τ , t
′
2 ≡ t,
t1 ≡ Is r1 τ , r1 ≫n r2, and r2 ≻
<α
Rβ
c for some c ∈ τ ∈ T . By part (iii) of the
inductive hypothesis we have r1 ≻ c. Therefore t1 ≡ Is r1 τ ⇒ t ≡ t′2.
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Finally, suppose t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
2 follows by condition (8). Then e.g. t2
|ǫ ≡ t′2
|ǫ ≡
t1
|ǫ ≡ Aτ , and for all c ∈ τ there exists tc such that t1|c ≫
n t2|c ⇒
α
Rβ
tc
∗ <α
⇒Rβ
t′2|c. By part (i) of the inductive hypothesis (h(t2|c) < h(t2)) there exists t
′
c such
that t1|c
∗
⇒ t′c ≫
n tc. Applying the inductive hypothesis again, we conclude that
there exists qc such that t
′
c
∗
⇒ qc ≫n t′2|c. Let q be such that q
|ǫ ≡ Aτ and
q|c ≡ qc for c ∈ τ . Then t1|c
∗
⇒ q|c for all c ∈ τ , and hence t1 → q. We also have
q ≫n t′2, because q|c ≫
n t′2|c for all c ∈ τ .
We now show condition (ii). Thus suppose t1 ≫n t′1 and t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′1. We
consider possible forms of t2 according to the definition of t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
1.
If t2 ≡ t′1 then the claim is obvious. If t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′1 follows by condition (1) in
the definition of⇒αRβ , then t2 →
ǫ
Rβ
t′1 and the claim follows easily by inspecting
the definition of Rβ. If t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
1 follows by condition (2), then t2 ≡ r1r2,
t′1 ≡ r
′
1r
′
2, r1 ⇒
α
Rβ
r′1, r2 ⇒
α
Rβ
r′2, t1 ≡ q
′
1q
′
2, q
′
1 ≫
n r′1, q
′
2 ≫
n r′2. By the
inductive hypothesis (h(r1), h(r2) < h(t2)) there exist q1, q2 such that q1
∗
⇒ q′1,
q2
∗
⇒ q′2, q1 ≫
n r1, q2 ≫n r2. Thus q1q2
∗
⇒ t1 and q1q2 ≫n t2. If t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
1
follows by condition (3) or condition (4) then the argument is analogous.
If t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
1 follows by condition (5) then t2 ≡ cr1 . . . rm, ri ⇒
α
Rβ
r′i,
cr′1 . . . r
′
m →
ǫ
Rβ
t′1, t1 ≡ cq
′
1 . . . q
′
m, q
′
i ≫
n r′i. By the inductive hypothesis there
exist q1, . . . , qm such that qi
∗
⇒ q′i and qi ≫
n ri. Let q ≡ cq1 . . . qm. We have
q ≫n t2 and q
∗
⇒ cq′1 . . . q
′
m ≡ t1.
If t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′1 follows by condition (6) then t2 ≡ cr, t
′
1 ≡ c2 ≡ F(c)(c1), c ∈ τ
τ1
2 ,
r ≻<αRβ c1 ∈ τ1, t1 ≫
n c2. If t1 ≡ c2 then the claim is obvious. Otherwise t1 ≻ c2.
Let e ∈ (Boolτ1)τ1 be such that for d1, d2 ∈ τ1, we have F(e)(d1)(d2) ≡ t if d1 ≡
d2, and F(e)(d1)(d2) ≡ f if d1 6≡ d2. Let q ≡ λx.Cond (ec1x) t1 (cx) . If s ≻ d ∈ τ1
and d 6≡ c1 then qs⇒ Cond (ec1s) t1 (cs)
∗
⇒ Cond f t1 F(c)(d) ⇒ F(c)(d). If s ≻
c1 then qs⇒ Cond (ec1s) t1 (cs) ⇒ Cond t t1 (cs) ⇒ t1 ≻ F(c)(c1) ≡ c2. There-
fore q % c, and rank(q, c) = rank(t1, c2) ≤ n, since rank(F(c)(d),F(c)(d)) = 0.
Thus qr ≫n cr ≡ t2 and qr
∗
⇒ t1, because r ≻ c1.
If t2 ⇒αRβ t
′
1 follows by condition (7) then the claim is obvious. If t2 ⇒
α
Rβ
t′1
follows by condition (8) then e.g t2
|ǫ ≡ t′1
|ǫ ≡ t1
|ǫ ≡ Aτ and for all c ∈ τ there
exists tc such that t2|c ⇒
α
Rβ
tc
∗
⇒
<α
Rβ
t′1|c. We also have t1|c ≫
n t′1|c for all c ∈ τ .
Therefore by the inductive hypothesis for every c ∈ τ there exists t′c such that
t′c ≫
n tc and t
′
c
∗
⇒ t1|c. Again, by the inductive hypothesis (h(t2|c) < h(t2)), for
every c ∈ τ there exists qc such that qc ≫
n t2|c and qc
∗
⇒ t′c
∗
⇒ t1|c. Let q be
such that q|ǫ ≡ Aτ and q|c ≡ qc for c ∈ τ . Then q ≫
n t2 and q ⇒ t1.
It remains to show condition (iii). Thus suppose t1 ≫n t2 ≻αRβ c. If t2 ≡ c
then the claim is obvious. Otherwise c ∈ ττ12 and for every c1 ∈ τ1 there exists qc1
such that t2c1
∗ <α
⇒Rβ qc1 ≻
<α
Rβ
c. Since t1c1 ≫n t2c1, by part (i) of the inductive
hypothesis for each c1 ∈ τ1 there exists q′c1 such that t1c1
∗
⇒ q′c1 ≫
n qc1 ≻
<α
Rβ
c.
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By part (iii) of the inductive hypothesis we obtain q′c1 ≻ c. This implies that
t1 ≻ c.
Corollary F.24. If t2 ≻ c and t1c
∗
⇒ d ∈ Bool, then t1t2
∗
⇒ d.
The above lemma and the ensuing corollary confirm our intuition about the
meaning of ≻. This basically finishes the hard part of the proof. What remains
are some relatively straightforward lemmas.
Definition F.25. We write t ⊲ τ if t
∗
⇒ t′ ≻ c for some term t′ and some c ∈ τ .
Lemma F.26. We have Is t1 t2
∗
⇔ t iff there exists τ ∈ T such that t1 ⊲ τ and
t2
∗
⇒ τ . Moreover, this τ ∈ T is uniquely determined.
Proof. If t2
∗
⇒ τ ∈ T and t1
∗
⇒ t′ ≻ c for some c ∈ τ then Is t1 t2
∗
⇒ Is t1 τ
∗
⇒
Is t′ τ ⇒ t by condition (7) in the definition of⇒. If Is t1 t2
∗
⇔ t then Is t1 t2
∗
⇒ t
by the Church-Rosser property of ⇒ and the fact that t is in normal form. But
this is only possible when Is t1 t2
∗
⇒ Is t′ τ ⇒ t where τ ∈ T , t2
∗
⇒ τ and
t1
∗
⇒ t′ ≻ c for some c ∈ τ , i.e. t1 ⊲ τ .
To see that τ is uniquely determined it suffices to notice that it is in normal
form w.r.t. ⇒ and ⇒ has the Church-Rosser property.
Lemma F.27. The following conditions hold.
(a) If τ ∈ T and for all t2 such that t2 ⊲ τ we have t1t2
∗
⇔ t, then ∀τt1
∗
⇔ t.
(b) If τ ∈ T and there exists t2 such that t2 ⊲ τ and t1t2
∗
⇔ f , then ∀τt1
∗
⇔ f .
(c) If ∀t1t2
∗
⇔ t then for all t3 such that Is t3 t1
∗
⇔ t we have t2t3
∗
⇔ t.
(d) If ∀t1t2
∗
⇔ f then there exists t3 such that Is t3 t1
∗
⇔ t and t2t3
∗
⇔ f .
Proof. We show condition (a). Suppose τ ∈ T and for all t2 such that t2 ⊲ τ
we have t1t2
∗
⇔ t. If τ ≡ ∅ then ∀∅t1 → t and the claim is obvious. Otherwise
we have ∀τt1 → t where t|ǫ ≡ Aτ and t|c ≡ t1c for c ∈ τ . Since c ∈ τ we have
c ⊲ τ , so t1c
∗
⇔ t, hence t1c
∗
⇒ t by the Church-Rosser property. Therefore
t
∗
⇒ t. Condition (b) is shown in a completely analogous way.
We show condition (c). Suppose ∀t1t2
∗
⇔ t. Then ∀t1t2
∗
⇒ t, which is only
possible when ∀τt2
∗
⇒ t and t1
∗
⇒ τ for some τ ∈ T . Suppose t3 is such that
Is t3 t1
∗
⇔ t. Then Is t3 t1
∗
⇒ t, and we must have t1
∗
⇒ τ ′ ∈ T and t3 ⊲ τ ′,
by Lemma F.26. Because both τ and τ ′ are in normal form, we conclude by
the Church-Rosser property that τ ≡ τ ′. Hence t3 ⊲ τ , i.e. t3
∗
⇒ t′3 ≻ c ∈ τ .
Since ∀τt2
∗
⇒ t, it is easy to see by inspecting the definitions that t2c
∗
⇒ t. By
Corollary F.24 we obtain t2t3
∗
⇒ t2t′3
∗
⇒ t.
Condition (c) follows easily from definitions, Lemma F.26 and the Church-
Rosser property.
Lemma F.28. The following conditions hold.
(a) If τ1, τ2 ∈ T and for all t2 such that t2 ⊲ τ1 we have t1t2 ⊲ τ2, then t1 ⊲ τ
τ1
2 .
(b) If τ1, τ2 ∈ T , t1 ⊲ τ
τ1
2 and t2 ⊲ τ1 then t1t2 ⊲ τ2.
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Proof. We show condition (a). Suppose τ1, τ2 ∈ T and for all t2 such that t2 ⊲ τ1
we have t1t2 ⊲ τ2. Let c ∈ τ1. We obviously have c ⊲ τ1, so t1c ⊲ τ2, i.e. there
exists a term tc and a constant c
′τ2 such that t1c
∗
⇒ tc ≻ c
′. Recall that ττ12
consists of all set-theoretic functions from τ1 to τ2. In particular, there exists
d ∈ ττ12 such that F(d)(c) ≡ c
′ for every c ∈ τ1 and c′ ∈ τ2 depending on c as
above. But then t1 ≻ d, and hence t1 ⊲ τ
τ1
2 .
We show condition (b). Suppose τ1, τ2 ∈ T , t1 ⊲ τ
τ1
2 and t2 ⊲ τ1. Then
t1
∗
⇒ t′1 ≻ c ∈ τ
τ1
2 and t2
∗
⇒ t′2 ≻ c1 ∈ τ1. By condition (6) in the definition
of ⇒ we obtain ct′2 ⇒ F(c)(c1) ≻ F(c)(c1) ∈ τ2. If t
′
1 ≡ c then t1t2
∗
⇒ ct′2 ⇒
F(c)(c1) ∈ τ2, so t1t2 ⊲ τ2. Otherwise t′1t
′
2 ≫ ct
′
2 ⇒ F(c)(c1), and by part (i)
of Lemma F.23 there exists t such that t1t2
∗
⇒ t′1t
′
2
∗
⇒ t ≻ F(c)(c1) ∈ τ2. Hence
t1t2 ⊲ τ2.
Lemma F.29. If Subtype t1 t2
∗
⇔ τ ∈ T then there exists τ ′ ∈ T such that
τ ⊆ τ ′, t1
∗
⇒ τ ′, and for all terms t3:
(a) if t3 ⊲ τ
′ then t2t3 ⊲ Bool,
(b) t3 ⊲ τ iff t3 ⊲ τ
′ and t2t3
∗
⇔ t.
Proof. Suppose Subtype t1 t2
∗
⇔ τ ∈ T . Since τ is in normal form, we conclude
by the Church-Rosser property that Subtype t1 t2
∗
⇒ τ . By inspecting the defi-
nition of R we see that this is only possible when t1
∗
⇒ τ ′ ∈ T . If τ ′ ≡ ∅ then
Subtype t1 t2
∗
⇒ ∅ and by the Church-Rosser property we obtain τ ≡ ∅. If τ ≡ ∅
then obviously τ ⊆ τ ′ and both conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied, because
t3 6⊲ ∅ for any t3, as t3 ⊲ ∅ would require the existence of some c ∈ ∅.
So suppose τ ′ 6≡ ∅ and τ 6≡ ∅. Then Subtype τ ′ t2 → t where t|ǫ ≡ Sτ ′ and
t|c ≡ t2c for c ∈ τ
′. By the Church-Rosser property we have t
∗
⇒ τ , and by
inspecting the definitions we easily see that this is only possible when t2c ≡
t|c
∗
⇒ dc ∈ Bool for every c ∈ τ ′ and τ = {c ∈ τ ′ | dc ≡ t}. But then obviously
τ ⊆ τ ′. To show (a) suppose t3 ⊲ τ ′, i.e. t3
∗
⇒ t′3 ≻ c ∈ τ
′. By Corollary F.24 we
obtain t2t3
∗
⇒ dc ∈ Bool. We now prove (b). Suppose t3 ⊲ τ , i.e. t3
∗
⇒ t′3 ≻ c ∈ τ .
Since τ ⊆ τ ′ we obviously have t3 ⊲ τ ′. By Corollary F.24 we obtain t2t3
∗
⇒ dc.
Since c ∈ τ we have dc ≡ t. For the other direction, assume t2t3
∗
⇒ t and t3 ⊲ τ ′,
i.e. t3
∗
⇒ t′3 ≻ c ∈ τ
′. By Corollary F.24 we have t2t3
∗
⇒ dc ∈ Bool. By the
Church-Rosser property we conclude dc ≡ t. Hence c ∈ τ and t3 ⊲ τ .
Lemma F.30. (a) ∨t1t2
∗
⇔ t iff t1
∗
⇔ t or t2
∗
⇔ t.
(b) ∨t1t2
∗
⇔ f iff t1
∗
⇔ f and t2
∗
⇔ f .
(c) Eq t1 t2
∗
⇔ t iff t1
∗
⇔ t2.
(d) If ∀tλx.f
∗
⇔ f with x /∈ FV (t2), then Is (Choice t) t
∗
⇔ t.
Proof. Follows easily from definitions and the Church-Rosser property.
Lemma F.31. Suppose ι ∈ TI , ι = µ(〈ι1,1, . . . , ι1,n1〉, . . . , 〈ιm,1, . . . , ιm,nm〉),
cιi ∈ C has arity ni, ι
∗
i,j = ιi,j if ιi,j ∈ TI , ι
∗
i,j = ι if ιi,j = ⋆, and ι¯
∗
i,j ∈ T¯I
is the subset of K determined by ι∗i,j (see Definition F.1). Let t be a term.
If for all i = 1, . . . ,m we have:
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– for all t1, . . . , tni such that
• tj ⊲ ι¯∗i,j for j = 1, . . . , ni, and
• ttj
∗
⇒ t for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ni such that ιi,j = ⋆
we have t(cιit1 . . . tni)
∗
⇒ t
then ∀ι¯t
∗
⇒ t.
Proof. Note that for every Is-term in TI (see Definition F.1) there exists a
semantic term corresponding to it in the obvious way. Thus, we may assume
without loss of generality that TI is a set of semantic terms. Let s ∈ ι¯. It follows
by straightforward induction on the structure of the term r ∈ TI corresponding
to s (see Definition F.1) that tr
∗
⇒ t. It is easy to see from the definition of R
that r ⇒ s. Therefore ts
∗
⇒ t.
Lemma F.32. ∀ (SubtypeBool (λx.f)) (λx.f) ⇒ t.
Proof. It is easy to see that Subtype Bool (λx . f)⇒ ∅, and by definition of R we
have ∀ ∅λx . f → t.
Lemma F.33. If ∀ (SubtypeBool (λx.t))
∗
⇒ t and x /∈ FV (t) then t
∗
⇒ ⊤ or
t
∗
⇒ ⊥.
Proof. Follows easily from definitions and the Church-Rosser property.
Definition F.34. For τ ∈ T , we write t1 ∼τ t2 if for every term t such that
t ⊲ Boolτ we have tt1
∗
⇔ tt2.
Lemma F.35. If τ1, τ2 ∈ T , τ = τ
τ1
2 , t1 ⊲ τ , t2 ⊲ τ and for all s such that
s ⊲ τ1 we have t1s ∼τ2 t2s, then t1 ∼τ t2.
Proof. We have t1
∗
⇒ t′1 ≻ c1 ∈ τ and t2
∗
⇒ t′2 ≻ c2 ∈ τ . Let d1 ∈ τ1, d2 ∈ τ2
and let f ∈ Boolτ2 be such that F(f)(d2) ≡ t and F(f)(d) ≡ f for d 6= d2.
Since t′1 ≻ c1, there exists s1 such that t
′
1d1
∗
⇒ s1 ≻ F(c1)(d1). Analogously
t′2d1
∗
⇒ s2 ≻ F(c2)(d1). Because t1d1 ∼τ2 t2d1, we have f(t1d1)
∗
⇔ f(t2d1). We
have f(t1d1)
∗
⇒ f(t′1d1)
∗
⇒ fs1. Since s1 ≻ F(c1)(d1) ∈ τ2 and f ∈ Bool
τ2 ,
we obtain fs1 ⇒ F(f)(F(c1)(d1)) by condition (6) in the definition of ⇒.
Analogously f(t2d1)
∗
⇒ F(f)(F(c2)(d1)). Hence, by the Church-Rosser prop-
erty F(f)(F(c1)(d1)) ≡ F(f)(F(c2)(d1)). In other words, F(c1)(d1) ≡ d2 iff
F(c2)(d1) ≡ d2. Since d2 ∈ τ2 was arbitrary, F(c1)(d1) ≡ F(c2)(d1). But d1 ∈ τ1
was also arbitrary, so c1 ≡ c2.
Now, let t be such that t ⊲ Boolτ . Then t
∗
⇒ t′ ≻ p ∈ Boolτ . We have
tt1
∗
⇒ t′t1
∗
⇒ t′t′1 ≫ pc1 ⇒ F(p)(c1). By part (i) of Lemma F.23 we have t
′t′1
∗
⇒
r1 ≫ F(p)(c1) for some term r1. But F(p)(c1) ∈ Bool, so in fact r1 ≡ F(p)(c1)
Analogously tt2
∗
⇒ F(p)(c2) ≡ F(p)(c1). Therefore tt1
∗
⇔ tt2. Hence t1 ∼τ t2.
Lemma F.36. Define t1 ⊃ t2 by t1 ⊃ t2 ≡ ∀(Subtype Boolλx.t1)λy.t2, where
x, y /∈ FV (t1, t2). If t1 ⊃ t2
∗
⇒ t and t2 ⊃ t1
∗
⇒ t, then t1
∗
⇔ t2.
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Proof. Suppose t1 ⊃ t2
∗
⇒ t and t2 ⊃ t1
∗
⇒ t. We thus have
∀(Subtype Boolλx.t1)λy.t2
∗
⇒ t
which is only possible when (Subtype Boolλx.t1)
∗
⇒ τ ∈ T . But this in turn is
only possible when t1
∗
⇒ t′1 ∈ {t, f}. By an analogous argument t2
∗
⇒ t′2 ∈ {t, f}.
Now it is easy to see that if t′1 6= t
′
2 then t1 ⊃ t2
∗
⇒ f or t2 ⊃ t1
∗
⇒ f .
From now on, to avoid confusion, we use r, r1, r2, etc. to denote terms of Is,
and t, t1, t2, etc. to denote semantic terms.
Definition F.37. We define an Is-structure M = 〈A, ·, JK〉 as follows. As A
we take the set of equivalence classes of
∗
⇔ on semantic terms. We denote the
equivalence class of a semantic term t by [t]. We define [t1] · [t1] = [t1t2]. This is
well-defined because t1
∗
⇔ t′1 and t2
∗
⇔ t′2 imply t1t2
∗
⇔ t′1t
′
2. To save on notation,
we sometimes confuse [t] with t, where it does not lead to ambiguities.
Let v : V → A be an M-valuation. We define a function u from V to
semantic terms by u(x) = t where t is an arbitrary but fixed semantic term such
that [t] = v(x). By u[x/t] we denote a function w from V to semantic terms
such that w(y) = u(y) for y 6= x, and w(x) = t. By induction on the structure of
an Is-term r, we define a translation VrWu from terms of Is to semantic terms,
parametrized by a function u from V to semantic terms:
– VIsW = Is, VSubtypeW = Subtype, VFunW = Fun, V∀W = ∀, V∨W = ∨, V⊥W =
f , VǫW = Choice, VEqW = Eq, VCondW = Cond, VTypeW = Type, VPropW =
Bool, VιW = ι¯ for ι ∈ TI , VcιiW = c
ι
i for c
ι
i ∈ C, Vd
ι
i,jW = d
ι
i,j for d
ι
i,j ∈ D,
VoιiW = o
ι
i for o
ι
i ∈ O,
– VxWu = u(x) for x ∈ V ,
– Vr1r2W
u = Vr1W
u · Vr2Wu,
– Vλx . rWu = λy . VrWu[x/y] where x ∈ V and y ∈ V + is a fresh variable.
Now the interpretation JK is defined by
JrKv = [VrW
u]
where u is the function from V to semantic terms, corresponding to v, as defined
above.
Theorem F.38. The system eIs is consistent, i.e. 6⊢eIs ⊥.
Proof. We show thatM is an eIs-model. We need to check the conditions in Def-
inition E.2. Conditions (var) and (app) follow directly from the definition of M.
For condition (β) note that Jλx . rKv · [t] = [Vλx . rW
u] · [t] = [(λy . VrWu[x/y])t] =
[VrWu[x/t]] = JrKv[x/[t]] where u is like in Definition F.37. Condition (fv) is
obvious from the definition of JK. For condition (ξ) suppose Jλx . r1Kv · [t] =
Jλx . r2Kv · [t] for every semantic term t. Then in particular this holds for any
variable y ∈ V +. We have Jλx . r1Kv · [t] = [(λy . Vr1W
u[x/y])y] = [Vr1W
u[x/y]]
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and Jλx . r2Kv · [t] = [(λy . Vr2W
u[x/y])y] = [Vr2W
u[x/y]], where u is like in Defini-
tion F.37. Hence [Vr1W
u[x/y]] = [Vr2W
u[x/y]]. But Jλx . r1Kv = [λy . Vr1W
u[x/y]] and
Jλx . r2Kv = [λy . Vr2W
u[x/y]].
Condition (pr) follows from Lemma F.32. Condition (pt) follows directly from
the definition of R. Conditions (∀⊤), (∀⊥), (∀e) and (∀′e) follow from Lemma F.27
and Lemma F.26. Conditions (∨1) and (∨2) follow from Lemma F.30. Condi-
tion (⊃t2) follows from Lemma F.33. Condition (⊥) follows from Lemma F.32
and the Church-Rosser property. Conditions (→i) and (→e) follow from Lemma F.28
and Lemma F.26. Condition (→t) follows from the definition of R and the
Church-Rosser propery. Conditions (s1)-(s3) follow from Lemma F.29 and Lemma F.26.
Condition (s4) follows easily from definitions and Lemma F.26. Conditions (o1),
(o2), (d1) and (i2) follow directly from definitions. Condition (i1) follows from
Lemma F.31. Conditions (ǫ) and (eq) follow from Lemma F.30. Conditions (c1)
and (c2) are obvious from the definition of R and the Church-Rosser prop-
erty. Condition (ef) follows from Lemma F.35. Condition (eb) follows from
Lemma F.36.
Now suppose ⊢eIs ⊥. Then by Theorem E.5 we have M |= ⊥, so J⊥K = [t].
But we have J⊥K = [f ], which implies t
∗
⇔ f . This is impossible by the Church-
Rosser property of ⇒.
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Appendix G Complete Translation of First-Order Logic
In this appendix we show that the translation from Sect. 3 restricted to first-
order logic is complete, i.e. we prove Theorem 3.3. The method of the proof
is essentially the same as in [4], and it is a relatively simple application of the
construction from the previous appendix.
First, let us precisely state the definition of the system FO of classical first-
order logic.
Definition G.1. – The types of FO are given by
T ::= o | δ | δ → T
– The set of terms of FO of type τ , denoted Tτ , is defined as follows:
• Vδ ⊆ Tδ,
• Στ ⊆ Tτ ,
• if t1 ∈ Tδ→τ and t2 ∈ Tδ then t1t2 ∈ Tτ ,
• ⊥ ∈ To,
• if ϕ, ψ ∈ To then ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ To,
• if x ∈ Vδ and ϕ ∈ To then ∀x : δ . ϕ ∈ To,
where Vδ is a countable set of variables and for each τ ∈ T \ {o} the set Στ
is a countable set of constants. We assume that the sets Στ are all pairwise
disjoint, and disjoint with Vδ. Terms of type o are formulas. As usual, we
omit spurious brackets and assume that application associates to the left. We
identify α-equivalent terms, i.e. terms differing only in the names of bound
variables are considered identical.
– The system FO is given by the following rules and axioms, where ∆ is a
finite set of formulas, ϕ, ψ are formulas. The notation ∆,ϕ is a shorthand
for ∆ ∪ {ϕ}.
Axioms
• ∆,ϕ ⊢ ϕ
• ∆ ⊢ ((ϕ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ϕ
Rules
⊃FOi :
∆,ϕ ⊢ ψ
∆ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ
⊃FOe :
∆ ⊢ ϕ ⊃ ψ ∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ψ
∀FOi :
∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ∀x : δ . ϕ
x /∈ FV (∆) ∀FOe :
∆ ⊢ ∀x : δ . ϕ
∆ ⊢ ϕ[x/t]
t ∈ Tδ
Note that the system FO is a restriction of CPREDω.
A first-order structure A is a pair 〈A, {fc | c ∈ Στ , τ ∈ T }〉 where A is
the non-empty universe and fc are interpretations of constants (functions or
relations on A of appropriate arity, or elements of A). By JcKA we denote the
interpretation of c in A. A first-order valuation u is a function from variables
to the universe of a first-order structure. We define the relations of satisfaction
A |=FO ϕ and semantic consequence ∆ |=FO ϕ in an obvious way.
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The following is a well-known result from elementary logic.
Theorem G.2. ∆ ⊢FO ϕ iff ∆ |=FO ϕ
The mappings ⌈−⌉ and Γ (−) are defined exactly as in Sect. 3, restricting to
terms of FO. Recall that we assume Vδ ⊆ V and Στ ⊆ Σs for τ ∈ T .
Theorem G.3. If ∆ ⊢FO ϕ then Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢Is ⌈ϕ⌉.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 3.1.
In this section we use s, s1, s2, etc. for terms of Is. We assume that there
is a fresh constant δ ∈ Σs. This constant will represent the first-order universe.
We use the notation τn → τ for τ → . . .→ τ where τ occurs n+ 1 times, where
n > 0.
Theorem G.4. If Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢eIs ⌈ϕ⌉ then ∆ ⊢FO ϕ.
Proof. Suppose Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢eIs ⌈ϕ⌉ but ∆ 6⊢FO ϕ. Then ∆ 6|=FO ϕ, so there
exist a first-order structureA and a first-order valuation u such thatA, u |=FO ∆,
but A, u 6|=FO ϕ.
We use the construction of Definition F.37 to transform A into an eIs-mo-
del M, by taking the set of constants δ of M to consist of the elements of the
universe of A. We also need to extend the definition of the translation V−W from
Definition F.37 to interpret the new constants that we added to the language
of eIs. We set VδW = δ. If c ∈ Σδ then we set VcW = JcKA. If f ∈ Σδn→δ
then let cf ∈ δ(δ,...,δ) be such that F(cf )(a1)(a2) . . . (an) = JfKA(a1, . . . , an) for
any a1, . . . , an ∈ δ. We set VfW = cf . Similarly, if r ∈ Σδn→o then let cr ∈
Bool(δ,...,δ) be such that for all a1, . . . , an ∈ δ we have F(cr)(a1)(a2) . . . (an) = t
iff JrKA(a1, . . . , an) holds.
Note that in M we have δ = {a ∈ M | Is · a · δ = ⊤}. This follows directly
from Lemma F.26 and the fact that for a ∈ δ we have a /∈ ττ2 , and hence if t ⊲ a
then t
∗
⇔ a. Note also that any first-order A-valuation v is also an M-valuation,
if for a variable x we interpret v(x) as an element of the set δ in M.
Now it is easy to show by induction on the structure of a term t ∈ Tτ
that J⌈t⌉KMv = JtK
A
v ∈ δ for any first order-valuation v, where τ ∈ T \ {o}.
Using this we verify by straightforward induction on the structure of a first-
order formula ϕ that for any first-order valuation v we have J⌈ϕ⌉KMv = t iff
A, v |= ϕ, and J⌈ϕ⌉KMv = f iff A, v 6|= ϕ. For instance, suppose ϕ ≡ ∀x : δ . ψ.
Then ⌈ϕ⌉ = ∀x : δ . ⌈ψ⌉. Since Jδ : TypeKMv = t, and a ∈ A iff Is · a · δ = t, we
have J⌈ϕ⌉KMv = t iff J⌈ψ⌉K
M
v[x/a] = t for every a ∈ A iff A, v[x/a] |= ψ for every
a ∈ A iff A, v |= ∀x : δ . ψ ≡ ϕ, where we use the inductive hypothesis in the
second equivalence.
It is easy to check that M, u |=eIs Γ (∆,ϕ). Hence M, u |=eIs Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉,
because A, u |=FO ∆. Since A, u 6|=FO ϕ, we also have M, u 6|=eIs ⌈ϕ⌉. But by
Theorem E.5 and Γ (∆,ϕ), ⌈∆⌉ ⊢eIs ⌈ϕ⌉ we haveM, u |=eIs ⌈ϕ⌉. Contradiction.
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